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When China declared its East China Sea (ECS) Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) in November 2013, the declaration sparked fears that it would soon implement 
similar zones over the South China Sea (SCS), further exacerbating tensions in the 
region. Since Vietnam is projected to be the country most affected by China’s SCS 
ADIZ, this thesis focuses on how Vietnam’s leaders might respond. To do so, this thesis 
reviews reactions from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan during the 2013 ECS ADIZ 
crisis to identify a range of possible responses for Vietnam. It then explores how Vietnam 
has responded to past territorial disputes from China—both land and maritime—to 
identify similar challenges that an ADIZ might pose. Finally, it analyzes the range of 
responses within the context of Vietnam’s current strategies toward China. Research 
reveals that Vietnam has four major policy options: bilateral diplomacy, 
multilateralization/arbitration, complete defiance, and a mixture of civilian appeasement 
and military nonrecognition. The policy option Vietnam chooses will depend largely on 
its leadership preferences as well as domestic and geopolitical factors. 
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A. BACKGROUND AND MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In November 2013, China unilaterally—and without advanced warning—declared 
an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea (ECS). The move not 
only drew strong criticism from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, it also prompted fears 
among Southeast Asian countries that a similar pronouncement would soon be declared 
over the already contentious South China Sea (SCS), further complicating disputes in the 
region. As China strengthens and consolidates its military air capabilities, scholars and 
policymakers outside China continue to debate whether China will declare an ADIZ in 
the South China Sea and how Southeast Asian countries would respond if it did. Vietnam 
is the country that would be affected most by a SCS ADIZ; therefore, this thesis seeks to 
answer this question: how would Vietnam respond to a People’s Republic of China’s 
(PRC) declaration of an ADIZ over the South China Sea? 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The significance of the question boils down to two main points. First, the 
declaration of the ECS ADIZ has contributed to the escalation of existing conflicts in 
Northeast Asia; hence, we can expect a similar declaration in the SCS to exacerbate 
existing conflicts in Southeast Asia. Second, China’s challenges to Vietnam’s maritime 
territorial claims have prompted a sharpening of Vietnam’s responses in recent years, and 
the declaration of a Chinese ADIZ in the SCS is likely to worsen tensions between both 
countries and possibly lead to armed conflict. 
1. Escalation of Tensions 
The ECS ADIZ has already increased tensions in Northeast Asia. Chinese and 
Japanese military aircraft intercepts have swelled over the past several years. From March 
to December 2014, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) F-15s launched “379 times 
 2 
to intercept foreign aircraft—a sixfold increase over the same [period] in 2010.”1 While 
the majority of these intercepts ended in professional encounters, the April 2001 collision 
between the U.S. Navy EP-3 and the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) J-8 fighter 
highlights the dangerous nature of these aerial rendezvous. More recently, the November 
2015 downing of a Russian SU-24 by Turkish F-16s is a reminder of the deadly 
consequences of adversarial military-to-military aerial encounters. Worst still, the 
frequency of these intercepts in the ECS is likely to increase as the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) steps up its military exercises in its quest to construct and employ a capable 
blue-water navy. As a result of these efforts, PLA naval and air forces will likely need to 
push both operational and territorial limits, coming into increasing contact with the 
JASDF. To counter this new reality and maintain the status quo, the JASDF has had to 
increase its military presence. Already plans are under way to stand up an additional F-15 
squadron in Naha to handle that eventuality.2 As escalation occurs, the risk of a midair 
incident similar to the EP-3 accident becomes more pronounced. 
Much of that risk can be attributed to confusion stemming from China’s ECS 
ADIZ procedural requirement that all foreign aircraft—regardless of whether they are 
military or civilian—must submit advance flight plans to Chinese aviation authorities. 
Both Japan and the United States have argued that this requirement is contrary to 
common international practice, which limits the reporting requirement to aircraft that 
intend to overfly another country’s territorial airspace and not those that will simply 
transit through that country’s ADIZ. Consequently, this requirement has led to an 
international debate surrounding China’s intent for establishing the ECS ADIZ, centering 
on whether it was truly a defensive measure or an offensive plan to strengthen territorial 
control over the ECS and other regions where it has similar claims. 
If China’s intent is to strengthen its claims in the ECS, then it follows that China 
could use the ADIZ as another tool to bolster its claims in the SCS. Such a move would 
further stoke tensions with Vietnam, which has its own claims in the region. Already 
                                                 
1 Martin Fackler, “In a Test of Wills, Japanese Fighter Pilots Confront Chinese,” New York Times, 




overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea between China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan have spilled over onto issues such 
as fishing rights, oil exploration, and land reclamation. Indeed, the China’s annual 
unilaterally imposed fishing ban continues to be a source of friction between Vietnam 
and China. While Vietnamese fishermen have largely ignored the ban since 2001 due to 
China’s limited abilities to enforce the measures, China has intensified its maritime 
enforcement capabilities in recent years. Since 2009, China has impounded numerous 
Vietnamese fishing ships and detained hundreds of crewmembers—prompting numerous 
diplomatic protests from Vietnam.3 Additionally, the May 2014 deployment of a Chinese 
exploratory oil rig, HD-981, into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) further 
complicated the disputes, inflaming widespread anti-China protests throughout Vietnam 
and causing economic losses in the millions.4 Five Chinese citizens were killed and 
numerous foreign factories were destroyed, forcing China to evacuate many of its citizens 
from Vietnam and withdraw the rig in July—one month earlier than it had publicly 
announced.5 
2. Vietnam’s Sharpening Responses  
While these incidents themselves are not new, what is significant is the 
sharpening of Vietnam’s responses in recent years to China’s territorial claims. During 
the HD-981 incident, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung of Vietnam accused China of a 
“dangerous and serious violation” after China acknowledged that its vessels had blasted 
Vietnamese ships with water cannons.6 This tone stands in sharp contrast to the policy of 
deference adopted by Vietnam’s leadership in the decade prior.7 Moreover, Vietnam has 
                                                 
3 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the 
South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (December 2011): 357. 
4 Jenny W. Hsu and Cris Larano, “Vietnam Lashes Out at China, Tries to Coax Firms to Stay,” Wall 
Street Journal, May 21, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303480304579575934244928384. 
5 Robert Sutter and Chin-hao Huang, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: China Advances, More 
Opposition in South China Sea,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 2 (September 2014): 59, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/1402qchina_seasia.pdf. 
6 Ibid., 60. 
7 Alexander L. Vuving, “Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China Policy: A Changing Mixture of 
Pathways,” Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (2006), 820–21, doi: 10.1525/as.2006.46.6.805. 
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embarked on both self-help and balancing policies in recent history by modernizing its 
military and seeking regional allies, bolstering the likelihood of military confrontation. 
Consequently, examining Vietnam’s policy options should China declare an SCS ADIZ 
is important. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
If China imposes an ADIZ in the South China Sea, the response from Vietnam 
will depend on the leadership’s preferences and its policymaking process. If Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP) conservatives are dominant, Vietnam would be more likely to 
engage in bilateral multilevel talks, which have been historically successful at resolving 
long-standing disputes and diffusing tensions. The conservatives would prefer a policy of 
deference rather than risk escalating tensions. In this case, Vietnam’s civilian and military 
flights would probably comply with the Chinese ADIZ procedures. Still, such a policy 
would be politically risky given Vietnam’s current domestic sentiments toward China. As 
highlighted during the May 2014 HD-981 crisis, public protests can inflame latent anti-
Chinese sentiments and sour Sino-Vietnamese relations. Additionally, total 
relinquishment of airspace control would translate to Vietnam’s implicitly giving up its 
maritime claims in its EEZs—making this policy option less than optimal. 
On the other hand, if modernizers are dominant, Vietnam would be more inclined 
to multilateralize the issue and adopt a policy similar to Japan’s response. After initially 
condemning China’s actions, VCP leadership could instruct both its military and 
commercial aircraft transiting the new ADIZ to not comply with the Chinese instructions 
to submit advance flight plans. The VCP could later join with Japan in seeking legal 
recourse through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in determining if 
the zone threatens the order and safety of international aviation. The Vietnamese military 
would likely increase surveillance flights in the area to undermine any new rules from the 
China’s SCS ADIZ. This policy path, however, risks provoking China and straining Sino-
Vietnamese relations, something the VCP hopes to avoid given China’s greater power 
parity over Vietnam. 
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A third option is more likely to be chosen if internal disagreements over the 
direction of Vietnam’s policy toward China continue. In this case, neither conservative 
nor modernizer ideology is dominant. Consequently, Vietnam’s reaction will be driven by 
competing/contradictory forces, which will include elements of bilateral diplomacy as 
well as efforts to multilateralize. Quiet party-to-party negotiations may be successful at 
delinking the ADIZ issue from the larger SCS maritime disputes. As a compromise 
between the two factions, a possible response might include partial civilian appeasement 
with nonmilitary compliance. Vietnam’s commercial carriers would be instructed to 
comply in the interest of aviation safety while military/state aircraft would be ordered to 
reject the ADIZ rules outright. This policy allows Vietnam to explain its deference 
toward China, while appearing to take a strong position of defiance. 
A fourth, more assertive option involves Vietnam’s expanding its own ADIZ, 
similar to South Korea’s actions, as a signal to China that Vietnam is unwilling to 
acquiesce. In this scenario, Vietnam would be required to exercise its newly acquired 
self-help capabilities, especially its aerial assets, to undermine a Chinese SCS ADIZ and 
enforce its expanded zone. It would need to increase military flight patrols and intercept 
PLA aircraft that may overfly this new zone. This option would be considered if Vietnam 
feels that it cannot adequately resolve the dispute through other means and that it will 
lose significant legitimacy if this issue is not properly addressed. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer how Vietnam would likely respond to PRC declaration of a SCS 
ADIZ, I survey several comparative cases to establish an empirical foundation on which 
to base predictions about Vietnam’s likely response to the declaration. First, by 
examining the East Asian countries’ reactions to the ECS ADIZ declaration, I explore 
how and why these countries chose their particular responses. This examination enables 
me to flesh out the range of policy options for Vietnam. Next I examine how Vietnam has 
responded to past territorial disputes—both land and maritime—to identify challenges 
that are sufficiently similar to those an ADIZ might pose, describe the options Vietnam 
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faced, and explain why Vietnam responded the way it did to each challenge. Finally, I 
analyze the best policy option based on current Vietnam’s China foreign policy. 
Sources are drawn mostly from published academic research and foreign policy 
news journals. With regard to the more recent ECS ADIZ, the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) and International Crisis Group (ICG) have compiled some of the most 
comprehensive studies. Lacking from their reports, however, are Southeast Asian 
countries’ perspectives. Online foreign policy blogs and opinion pieces fill this gap. In 
the case of Vietnam’s response to land border and maritime challenges, the literature is 
extensive and encompasses both Western and Vietnamese analyses. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter II reviews the current literature. 
Chapter III traces the legal regime for ADIZs and explores key unresolved issues. 
Chapter IV is a case study of China’s ECS ADIZ. It investigates how China’s ADIZ has 
deviated from customary practices by introducing uncertainty and additional risk to the 
aviation community. This chapter also examines the responses from East Asian countries 
in order to identify and explore the range of policy options for Vietnam. Chapter V 
focuses on Vietnam’s responses to territorial challenges from China with an emphasis on 
identifying challenges that are similar to those an ADIZ might pose. The chapter also 
describes the options Vietnam faced and explains why Vietnam responded the way it did 
to each challenge. Finally, the conclusion analyzes the range of options with Vietnam’s 
existing policy pathways. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The current scholarship surrounding the South China Sea disputes is rather 
complex. This literature review, however, focuses on the following key relevant 
questions: (1) What is an ADIZ? (2) How is China’s ECS ADIZ different from other 
ADIZs? (3) How have other East Asian countries responded to a Chinese ADIZ? and (4) 
How has Vietnam responded to other territorial disputes? The purpose of the first 
question is to familiarize the reader with the technical, historical, and legal aspects 
surrounding an ADIZ that make it distinctive from maritime and land boundaries. This 
distinction is critical to understanding the second question—what characteristics make 
the PRC’s ADIZ so controversial? These two questions combine to highlight the 
challenges Vietnam would face if China declares an SCS ADIZ. After addressing that 
concern, we move on to reviewing cases from countries that have had to face a Chinese 
ADIZ challenge, more specifically those in the ECS. These cases are relevant because 
Vietnam has yet to be confronted by that sort of challenge, and there is little direct 
empirical evidence to draw historical comparisons. The value of this research is to 
extrapolate a spectrum of policy responses that Vietnam might be able to exercise. 
Finally, the last question traces how Vietnam has responded to similar past territorial 
challenges from China. This serves to explain how Vietnam is likely to respond to a 
challenge of a Chinese ADIZ in the SCS. 
A. WHAT IS AN ADIZ? 
ADIZs are technically and legally distinctive from maritime and land borders. The 
ICAO, the United Nations agency responsible for coordinating and regulating 
international civil aviation, defines ADIZs as “special designated airspace of defined 
dimensions within which aircraft are required to comply with special identification and/or 
reporting procedures additional to those related to the provision of air traffic services 
(ATS).”8 Its main purpose is to “properly identify all approaching aircraft for security 
                                                 
8 International Civil Aviation Organization, “Compliance Checklist (CC)/Electronic Filing of 
Differences (EFOD),” Annex 15, Amendment 37, 14th ed., July 2013, https://www.caa.govt.nz/ 
ICAO/Annex_15_Amdt_37_EFOD.pdf. 
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purposes so that they could, prior to entry into national airspace, satisfy certain local 
entry requirements.”9 This increased transparency, in theory, would reduce the number of 
unnecessary military intercepts to visually identify potential aerial threats and improve 
overall state security. Usually established by coastal states, ADIZs include a large area of 
airspace that can extend hundreds of miles beyond the establishing nation’s territorial 
boundaries to provide ample time to respond to aerial threats.10 Fast-moving aircraft, 
which can reach speeds in excess of 500 knots, make these vast swaths of airspace 
necessary to increase states’ reaction time—generally measured in minutes rather than 
hours. According to Raul Pedrozo, an aviation legal scholar, ADIZs are analogous to the 
states’ maritime entry conditions for ships entering port or navigating internal waters.11 
The comparison, however, stops there. Unlike the maritime regime, aviation is 
significantly more time sensitive due to a multitude of technical factors (e.g., aircraft fuel 
status, speed, weather conditions, air traffic clearances). Furthermore, it is very 
difficult—if not nearly impossible—to detain or subdue an aircraft without physically 
compromising it. 
Many states unilaterally establish and implement their ADIZ as part of their 
national early warning systems. The United States first introduced the concept in the 
1950s as a response to Cold War tensions; it currently has an extensive system of ADIZs 
that includes the contiguous United States, Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii. As administrator 
of postwar Japan, the United States also helped establish and implement Japan’s first 
ADIZ in the late 1950s. Since management of airspace was transferred back to Japan in 
1961, Japan’s ADIZ has undergone several expansions.12 To date, about 20 other nations 
                                                 
9 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, “In Search of Theoretical Justification for Air Defence Identification Zones,” 
Journal of Transportation Security 5, no. 1 (2012): 88, doi: 10.1007/s12198-011-0083-2. 
10 Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) (CRS Report No. 
R43894) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 2, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43894.pdf. 
11 Raul Pedrozo, “The Bull in the China Shop: Raising Tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 
International Law Studies 90 (2014): 72, https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a79b504a-46bf-45be-a587-
9ed51592a289/The-Bull-in-the-China-Shop--Raising-Tensions-in-th.aspx. 
12 Kimberly Hsu, “Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China Greater Flexibility to 
Enforce East China Sea Claims,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 
2014, 3. Note: The first expansion occurred in 1972, the second occurred in 2010 to cover Yonaguni Island. 
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have established ADIZs over their coastal airspace, including South Korea, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Burma, Oman, and India.13 
This prevalence aside, much of the current legal regime on international aviation 
has been rather ambiguous in addressing ADIZs. Based heavily on the 1944 Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) and the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the legal regime does not 
specifically address the legal basis for which states may establish ADIZs, nor are there 
any rules for aircraft operating in such zones. According to Ruwantissa Abeyratne, 
former senior legal officer for ICAO, “There is no overwhelming evidence, either from a 
scholastic or legislative perspective that lends legal legitimacy to the establishment of 
ADIZs.”14 Nevertheless, a state’s right to establish an ADIZ is generally accepted under 
the principle of self-defense and customary law.15 According to aviation legal scholars, 
its justification falls under the right of states to establish “reasonable conditions of entry 
into their land territory.”16 This right does not fall under any international agreement, but 
customary state practices. 
Despite this ambiguity, some countries avoid establishing ADIZs over contested 
territories, or, when issues arise, they seek agreeable settlements.17 This has not been an 
issue for the United States with its large network of ADIZs, due in part to its friendly 
neighbors. The United States does, nonetheless, coordinate and share responsibility with 
Canada for monitoring and enforcing portions of the Canadian ADIZ that border the 
United States. When the possibility of overlap arises, some countries coordinate 
agreeable settlements or avoid contested airspace altogether. For example, the JASDF 
and the South Korean military frequently share flight plans of military aircraft that 
                                                 
13 Pai Zheng, “Justifications and Limits of ADIZs under Public International Law.” Issues in Aviation 
Law and Policy 14, no. 2 (2015): 185. 
14 Abeyratne, “Search of Theoretical Justification,” 88. 
15 Christopher M. Petras, “The Law of Air Mobility–The International Legal Principles behind the 
U.S. Mobility Air Forces’ Mission,” Air Force Law Review 66 (2010), 63. 
16 Pedrozo, “Bull in the China Shop,” 72. 
17 Ibid., 74. 
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operate over disputed territory.18 Additionally, Japan has restrained itself from provoking 
Russia by not extending an ADIZ over the airspace of the disputed Kuril Islands.19 While 
the evidence of the cooperation between the United States and Canada points to 
coordination among allies, it is uncertain if rivals go through the same coordination 
effort. Still, Japan’s restraint over the Kuril Islands suggests that states are cognizant of 
the potential for conflict if they implement ADIZs over disputed territories. 
Another aspect of interest is states’ guidance regarding aircraft operating within 
foreign ADIZs. Literature on states’ guidance for aircraft usually draws two key 
distinctions: (1) civilian vs. state aircraft and (2) aircraft that simply transit an ADIZ vs. 
aircraft that intend to enter the airspace above another country’s land or territorial waters. 
For example, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations require civilian 
airlines to file flight plans and identify themselves regardless of whether they intend to 
enter or remain outside territorial airspace.20 Additionally, U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD) policy makes a distinction between aircraft not intending to enter territorial 
airspace and those that penetrate national airspace. According to the U.S. Navy’s 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, “U.S. military aircraft not 
intending to enter national airspace should not identify themselves or otherwise comply 
with ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the United States specifically 
agreed to do so.”21 Other countries have differences in guidance as well. Figure 1 
compares the variations between countries’ ADIZ rules. 
                                                 
18 Rinehart and Elias, “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone,” 37. 
19 Pedrozo, “Bull in the China Shop,” 74. 
20 ADIZ Flight Plan Requirements, 14 C.F.R. § 99.11a (2004). 
21 Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, United States 
Marine Corps, Department of Homeland Security, and United States Coast Guard, The Commander’s 
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Figure 1.  Comparison of ADIZ Features 
 
Source: Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 
(CRS Report No. R43894) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 4, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43894.pdf. 
B. HOW IS CHINA’S ECS ADIZ DIFFERENT? 
Why has there been an international outcry over China’s ECS ADIZ? 
International law does not prohibit countries from establishing their own ADIZ in the 
interest of national security.22 The first major point of friction involves how China 
established the zone. Most states work with bordering countries to coordinate and 
administer potential overlapping aviation zones. In contrast, China did not consult with its 
East Asian neighbors prior to declaring its ADIZ, which overlapped with preexisting 
Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese ADIZs. After the ECS declaration, China’s ECS 
ADIZ generated a large area of overlap with other East Asian ADIZs. The size of this 
overlap, as well as the fact it encompassed the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, sparked 
speculations that China was using the ADIZ as a tool for territorial consolidation, not for 
defensive security. 
Literature from Western and Chinese scholars also points to a second major area 
of contention involving how the new ADIZ procedures would be applied. Western 
observers criticized China for applying the rules to all aircraft—both civilian and state.23 
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23 Ibid., 68; Lowell Bautista and Julio Amador III, “Complicating the Complex: China’s ADIZ,” 
PacNet 87A (December 2013): 1. 
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Moreover, they accused China of failing to differentiate between aircraft flying parallel 
with China’s coastlines through the ADIZ and those intending to penetrate the PRC’s 
territorial airspace.24 Western scholars contended that China was exacerbating tensions in 
the region by requiring all aircraft to provide flight plans and radio, transponder, and logo 
identifications or face threats of “defensive emergency measures,” which were not well 
defined. In contrast, Chinese scholars have defended the scope of the ECS ADIZ 
procedures. They argue that the requirement for advance flight plans was not dissimilar 
from other countries’ ADIZs. Michael Swaine, a China policy analyst, notes that the 
published procedures of the Philippines, Myanmar, Taiwan, and Australia require filing 
advance flight plans but have no specific references to the aircraft’s final destination.25 
Furthermore, according to Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), Japan 
requires Taiwanese airlines to submit flight plans when traversing Japan’s ADIZ.26 
Within this context, China’s rules do not violate international law, and the criticism 
China faced has little merit. 
C. HOW HAVE EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AND VIETNAM REACTED TO 
THE CHINESE ECS ADIZ? 
Vietnam has yet to face an explicit Chinese ADIZ challenge in the SCS. Hence 
reviewing cases from East Asian countries that have had to confront a similar Chinese 
ADIZ challenge is necessary to explore the range of policy options. Furthermore, 
Vietnam has had to operate its civilian aircraft within China’s ECS ADIZ, and examining 
Vietnam’s responses during the original implementation can help identify likely policy 
preferences. 
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When China declared its ECS ADIZ, Japanese leaders were understandably 
highly critical and confrontational due to two controversial aspects. First, the new ADIZ 
overlaps with existing zones that Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) had established 
years before.27 Second, part of the new ADIZ covers the airspace over Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands, which Japan currently occupies and administers. Japanese officials saw the move 
as an attempt to “pressure Japan to concede on the islands.”28 When reports surfaced that 
Japanese commercial airliners were initially obeying China’s identification rules, the 
government ordered its domestic carriers to ignore the new Chinese procedures for flights 
that did not enter China’s territorial airspace. Since then, Japan has pursued several 
courses of action. It has sought multilateral legal actions through an ICAO proposal to 
“examine whether China’s actions threaten the order and safety of international 
aviation.”29 Additionally, the Japanese parliament has unilaterally approved a resolution 
declaring “the ECS ADIZ a violation of international law.”30 Furthermore, Japan has also 
sought the backing of its principal ally, the United States, to condemn China’s ECS 
ADIZ.31 
2. South Korea 
Like Japan, South Korea did not react positively to China’s ECS ADIZ 
declaration, yet its response was more tempered than that of Japan. The ROK’s vice 
defense minister expressed “strong regret” regarding China’s ECS ADIZ 
announcement.32 In previously scheduled meetings between senior defense officials at 
the end of November 2013, South Korea quietly requested that China redraw its ADIZ so 
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it would not overlap with its own.33 The request was ultimately rejected. Having failed to 
convince China to redraw the zone, the ROK turned to another strategy. On December 8, 
2013, in consultation with the United States, China, and Japan, the ROK expanded its 
own ADIZ 186 nautical miles to the south to match its preexisting flight information 
region (FIR).34 
3. Taiwan 
Taiwan’s official reaction to the ECS ADIZ was much more muted than that of 
Japan and South Korea.35 Despite the government’s expressing “high concerns,” its CAA 
instructed domestic airliners to comply with the ADIZ rules and file the requested flight 
information in the interest of aviation safety.36 President Ma Ying-jeou also publicly 
stated that the ADIZ “was not helpful to the development of cross-strait relations.”37 
4. Vietnam 
The ECS ADIZ declaration definitely surprised, if not alarmed, Hanoi. Vietnam’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to downplay the issue and urged restraint in the 
region.38 The government instructed its commercial carriers to submit flight plans to 
Chinese authorities when transiting through the ECS ADIZ.39 While Japan instructed its 
military aircraft to disregard the ECS ADIZ rules, it is unclear whether Vietnam’s 
military aircraft followed in the same direction or complied with the new requirements. 
This factor might not be a cause for concern given that Vietnamese military aircraft tend 
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to favor closer coastal waters and rarely venture into the ECS. Still, it would likely 
become another source of friction if and when China implements an SCS ADIZ. 
D. HOW HAS VIETNAM REACTED TO PAST CHINESE TERRITORIAL 
CHALLENGES? 
While the fear is that China could soon declare an ADIZ over the South China 
Sea, this new dimension is comparable to previous territorial challenges that Vietnam has 
encountered from China. By tracing how Vietnam has responded to similar past territorial 
challenges from China, we can predict how Vietnam is likely to react to the declaration of 
a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea.  
To address territorial disputes, the literature on Vietnam’s foreign policy suggests 
Vietnam uses three primary strategies: (1) engaging in party-to-party talks, (2) promoting 
multilateralism, and (3) increasing self-help capabilities/balancing.40 First, bilateral party-
to-party talks at the working group level, government level (deputy/vice-minister), 
foreign ministry level, and high level (presidents, prime ministers, and general secretary) 
have proven effective at resolving various long-standing land border and maritime 
disputes.41 For example, on December 30, 1999, Vietnam and China signed the Land 
Border Treaty, ending the border dispute originated after the brief Sino-Vietnamese War 
in 1979. In 2000, the two countries settled their Gulf of Tonkin disagreements through the 
Agreement on Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental 
Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin.42 Overall, these bilateral agreements underscore that 
cooperation is possible when they are detached from other contentious issues. 
Second, for much more complex and contentious issues related to the South China 
Sea, Vietnam has complemented its party-to-party talks with multilateralization through 
regional organizations and institutions. This strategy affords Vietnam the ability to 
reframe the issue and seek support from nations that share similar interests against a 
larger rival to achieve greater parity than if it were to go in alone. Thus, Vietnam sees the 
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional institutions as 
central to advancing this multilateralization strategy. According to Carlyle Thayer, a 
Vietnam observer, “Vietnam’s [strategy] is to promote multilateral efforts to enmesh 
China in a web of cooperative relations.”43 For instance, Vietnam used its position as 
ASEAN chair in 2010 to multilateralize the South China Sea disputes and to gain the 
support of regional partners.44 Still, not all ASEAN countries share Vietnam’s strong 
position against China. Malaysia tempers its official language regarding the South China 
Sea disputes despite demands from the Philippines and Vietnam to take a tougher stance. 
Vietnam’s third strategy to counter China is to grow its self-help capabilities. The 
Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) has been engaged in a modernization effort to 
professionalize its forces and acquire updated military hardware.45 Recently the VPA 
took delivery of its fifth Kilo-class diesel submarine, several Gepard-class frigates, and 
numerous SU-30 fighter aircraft from Russia.46 An unexpected regional partner, Japan, 
has also offered to help. In August 2015, as part of an aid package from Japan, Vietnam’s 
Fisheries Resources Surveillance Department received its first of three maritime 
surveillance ships to patrol the South China Sea.47 
All three strategies, however, depend on Vietnamese political leadership. 
Throughout the last decade, scholars of Vietnamese domestic politics have offered 
several labels for the broad power blocs. These include the following: anti-imperialists, 
integrationists, conservatives, modernizers, and moderates.48 Currently the most 
commonly used terms to represent the three dominant blocs are conservatives, 
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modernizers, and moderates.49 Despite the varying labels, what is important is each 
bloc’s policy preference toward China. Conservatives prefer a strategy of solidarity with 
China while modernizers prefer internationalization and integration into the global 
community.50 Moderates have no strong policy preferences and will side with 
conservatives or modernizers whenever their interests align.51 
Vietnam’s China policy is not driven by leadership preference alone but also by 
the VCP’s primary interest—regime security. From its perspective, regime security 
equates to state security. Border disputes with China—if left unresolved—have the 
potential to morph into a security threat, which can negatively impact Vietnam’s 
sovereignty and stability.52 Hence, the VCP has made a concerted effort to address those 
concerns over the last two decades. 
In the last five years, Vietnam’s top leadership has held differing views toward 
China. Before the January 2016 National Congress, the country’s top three positions were 
occupied by General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, 
and President Truong Tan Sang. Often viewed as an ideological conservative and part of 
the old guard from northern Vietnam, Trong has been associated with being pro-China.53 
Conversely, the younger southerner Dung is regarded as a modernizer and reformist, 
favoring a stronger anti-China position.54 As for Sang, it is unclear which policy direction 
he supports. 
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After the recent January 2016 National Congress, Vietnam’s vision toward China 
remains unclear. On the one hand, the reelection of Trong to the top leadership position 
suggests a conservative path toward China. On the other hand, domestic factors such as 
rising anti-China nationalism and a stagnant economy are pressuring the VCP to continue 
implementing reforms from modernizers.55 This mixture of conservatives, modernizers, 
and moderates—especially at the top tier of leadership—makes it difficult to generalize 
Vietnam’s policy direction toward China. Still, while it is not completely clear which 
vision the current leadership favors, any policy response will undoubtedly comprise a 
mixture of the three strategies above. 
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III. THE LEGAL REGIME OF ADIZS 
Since the United States established the first ADIZ in the 1950s as a response to 
Cold War tensions, numerous coastal states have followed suit and implemented similar 
zones in adjacent waters in the interest of national security. With such expansion, 
questions and challenges have been made to the legality and validity of such zones in the 
context of international law. While few states challenge the legality of the establishment 
of ADIZs, the interpretation and scope of the rules in such zones are still debated 
considerably. As a result, key national security issues involving the sovereignty of 
airspace above EEZs and the treatment of state aircraft remain fundamentally unresolved. 
This chapter aims to define ADIZs, trace the origins and evolution of the international 
legal regime, and describe how that legal regime regarding ADIZs is largely 
ambiguous—leaving states to unilaterally define and implement their own ADIZs. 
A. ADIZS AND THEIR PREVALENCE 
Since the Korean War, coastal states have attempted to exert control over their 
adjacent airspace in the name of national security. These designated areas can extend 
hundreds of miles seaward and encompass significant sections of airspace in which all 
aircraft are required to identify, report, and follow certain rules specified by the 
governing state. An American aviation scholar further elaborates: “An ADIZ is generally 
setup to facilitate identification of approaching aircraft for national security purposes and 
. . . requires that aircraft entering territorial airspace from points outside satisfy certain 
identification requirements as a condition of entry. These may include mandates to filing 
a flight plan, two-way radio and transponders, and position reporting.”56 Consequences 
for aircraft not adhering to ADIZ procedures may range from aerial interception by 
military aircraft to the more extreme aerial attack.57 Accordingly, most operators consider 
these rules mandatory. 
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ADIZs are not new, and many coastal nations have established them as part of 
their national security systems. The United States, in response to the threat from the 
Soviet Union, introduced the concept in 1950 to provide warning of a surprise attack. 
Since then, it has established five additional zones along the East Coast, West Coast, 
Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam. Canada instituted its own ADIZ in 1951, with the Philippines 
and France following suit in the mid to late 1950s. Later, in the 1960s, the Soviet Union 
created its own ADIZ after the downing of a U-2 spy plane over its territory. Today, 
about 20 nations have designated coastal ADIZs, including China, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Burma, Oman, and India.58 
Despite their prevalence, no international law expressly grants nations the 
authority to establish ADIZs. Saadat Bilal observes, “The authority to establish an ADIZ 
is not given by any international treaty nor prohibited by international law and is not 
regulated by any international body.”59 Furthermore, scholars of aviation law have noted 
that the justification for ADIZs falls under the right of states to establish “reasonable 
conditions of entry into [their] national airspace.”60  
Prior to 2011, no protests have been documented against the establishment of 
ADIZs.61 Still, ADIZs are not without controversy. Coastal ADIZs often overlap 
maritime zones, and numerous challenges have been made regarding the legality and 
validity of these zones. Of particular security interest are the airspaces directly above land 
and territorial waters, high seas, and economic exclusive zones. Questions regarding the 
airspaces’ associated rules and their applicability to foreign—both civil and state—
aircraft often arise. The following section explores how the relevant international legal 
regime treats coastal airspace and the larger implications on ADIZs. 
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B. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF AIRSPACE AND AIRCRAFT 
In general, ADIZs are not clearly defined in the current international legal regime. 
Apart from a generic definition of ADIZs provided in the literature review, a CRS report 
notes that “ICAO provides no specific standards or guidance with respect to the 
establishment of ADIZs, or air traffic rules or procedures for aircraft operating within 
designated ADIZs.”62 Consequently, this ambiguity in the international legal regime has 
prompted states to unilaterally establish their own rules and procedures. 
Nevertheless, aspects of the legal basis for ADIZs can be traced to several 
international agreements that regulate airspace sovereignty and aircraft operations. These 
agreements include the 1919 Paris Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 
(Paris Convention); its replacement, the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (Chicago Convention); and the 1982 UNCLOS. 
1. Airspace above Land and Territorial Seas 
One of the fundamental aspects of airspace sovereignty is the right of states to 
regulate the airspace directly above their territories and their superjacent territorial seas. 
The Paris Convention was the first multilateral attempt to codify this right. Michael 
Milde, a respected legal scholar who has helped draft ICAO regulations, notes that the 
1919 Paris Convention ended almost two decades of academic discussions on the issue of 
airspace jurisdiction over land territory by declaring that “every state has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace directly above its territory.”63 The 1944 Chicago 
Convention later reaffirmed this right and expanded it to include the territorial waters. 
Articles 1 and 2 state 
The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and 
exclusive Sovereignty over the air space above its territory. . . .For the 
purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be 
the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto.64 
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The language within Article 2, however, introduced a definitional problem 
regarding the specific meaning of “territorial waters.” UNCLOS resolved this issue in 
1982 by defining the territorial seas as an area “not exceeding 12 nautical miles, 
measure[d] from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”65 
Furthermore, Article 2 of UNCLOS made it clear that the sovereignty of coastal states 
included the “airspace above the territorial sea.”66 The legal regime is now clear—the 
airspace directly above a state’s land territory and its superjacent territorial sea belongs 
exclusively to the coastal state. 
2. Airspace over the High Seas 
ADIZs often extend over areas of airspace commonly known as “high seas” 
where much of transoceanic aviation occurs. Of particular security interest is the ability 
of coastal states to regulate such airspace, and UNCLOS and several international 
agreements provide relevant guidance. UNCLOS indirectly defines the high seas in 
Article 86 as “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in 
the territorial waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”67 
Going further, UNCLOS also limits states’ jurisdiction of the airspace over the high 
seas.68 Additionally, it explicitly grants freedom of overflight to all aircraft above the 
high seas. Article 87 of UNCLOS specifically states 
The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by 
this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter 
alia, both for coastal and land-locked States . . . freedom of overflight.69 
This freedom had been codified in previous international agreements in the 
decades leading up to UNCLOS. In 1956, the International Law Commission formally 
recognized that the freedom to fly over the high seas was derived from the freedom of the 
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high seas themselves.70 Two years later, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 
1958 also cited that “no State may validly purport to subject any part of them [the high 
seas] to its sovereignty.”71 These agreements make sovereignty of airspace over the high 
seas rather unambiguous—states have no legal jurisdiction over the airspace of the high 
seas. 
Nevertheless, according to Milde, there cannot be a legal void over this airspace 
because such a vacuum would risk endangering the safety of aircraft sharing that 
airspace.72 Article 12 of the Chicago Convention states that “over the high seas, the rules 
in force shall be those established under this Convention.”73 In this matter, the Chicago 
Convention asserted its right to regulate civil aircraft traffic via the ICAO Council, whose 
mission is to enhance aviation safety by developing international air navigation principles 
and procedures.74 In short, civil aircraft operating over the high seas are subject to ICAO 
regulations. 
3. Airspace over EEZs 
While the issue of airspace sovereignty above territorial seas and the high seas is 
rather clear, the introduction of economic exclusive zones in 1982 started to generate 
debates surrounding states’ jurisdiction of airspace above EEZs. In the decades leading 
up to UNCLOS, a number of states attempted to exert control beyond the traditional 
territorial seas (previously three nautical miles) to protect fishing and other natural 
resources.75 According to Milde, several states had unilaterally claimed rights to the 
territorial seas as far as 200 miles out; these rights were subsequently contested by other 
states on the basis of freedom of navigation and overflight.76 As a compromise, 
UNCLOS established the concept of EEZs, which has a very specific legal regime. Milde 
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describes an EEZ as a “zone sui generis with special economic rights reserved for the 
coastal State. . . . [Its rights] relate only to the natural resources of the sea . . . and the 
coastal State cannot interfere with the traditional freedoms of the high seas, in particular 
the right of navigation and overflight.”77 Nevertheless, a small number of states 
attempted to assert sovereignty over the airspace directly above the newly introduced 
EEZs. In one case in 1985, Brazil unsuccessfully petitioned the legal committee of ICAO 
to classify the airspace directly above its EEZ as territorial airspace.78 The committee 
ultimately rejected this argument, citing that Brazil’s interpretation was “contradicting 
the relevant provisions [of UNCLOS].”79 This unsuccessful challenge appeared to have 
mostly settled the issue of airspace sovereignty above EEZs. Still, as we will discuss 
later, some states have attempted to exert jurisdictional control the airspace above EEZs 
despite this ruling. 
4. Civil versus State Aircraft 
In addition to airspace, the legal regime also attempts to regulate aircraft that 
operate in the various regions of airspace. The current legal regime draws a distinction 
between civil and state aircraft. According to Milde, the vast majority of international air 
law focuses only on civil aircraft while specifically excluding the status and operation of 
‘state aircraft.’80 This disparity is reflected in the Chicago Convention and other lesser-
known agreements. Article 3 of the Chicago Convention states 
a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be 
applicable to State aircraft. 
b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed 
State aircraft. 
c) No State aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of 
another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement 
or otherwise, in accordance with the terms thereof. 
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d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their State 
aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil 
aircraft.81 
This article essentially limits the Chicago Convention’s scope of applicability to 
only civil aircraft. Other lesser-known international agreements continued this trend.82 
They used the phrase, “this Convention shall not apply to the aircraft used in military, 
customs or police services” to specially exclude state aircraft.83 As a result, state aircraft 
are largely exempt from international regulations. 
The exclusion of state aircraft from international regulations, however, does not 
completely absolve individual states them of certain responsibilities and limits when it 
came to operations. For example, under Article 3d of the Chicago Convention cited 
above, states are directed to operate state aircraft with “due regard for the safety of 
navigation of civil aircraft.”84 Additionally, state aircraft are prohibited from “using 
weapons against civil aircraft in flight or endangering the lives and safety of persons 
onboard during interception.”85 
The limited legal regime governing state aircraft, consequently, has left a legal 
deficiency for military aircraft in peacetime that has raised questions regarding the status 
of military aircraft. More specially, what constitutes a “military” aircraft? The Chicago 
Convention does not give any definitional clarity.86 Aviation scholars have offered that 
certain characteristics of an aircraft such as the design, registration marks, ownership, and 
type of operation may be used in combination to classify military aircraft.87 These 
characteristics, however, remain ill-defined as advances in technology outpace regulatory 
attempts. Milde highlights this legal void: “The status of military aircraft is not clearly 
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determined by positive rules of international law and is not particularly transparent or 
unequivocal.”88 Accordingly, the current legal regime does not sufficiently address 
military aircraft that operate over extraterritorial airspace. 
In summary, the international aviation legal regime has been largely ambiguous 
on the establishment and implementation of ADIZs. On the one hand, it does not 
specifically prohibit establishment of ADIZs; on the other hand, several international 
conventions narrowly define coastal states’ airspace sovereignty and the accompanying 
rights to regulate foreign aircraft. These axioms can be summarized as follows: 
1. ADIZs may be legally justified under customary law for entry of aircraft 
into territorial airspace.89 
2. States have sovereignty over the airspace directly above their territory and 
superjacent territorial waters.90 
3. The airspace over the high seas is beyond the jurisdiction of any state.91 
4. The international legal regime does not comprehensively address 
state/military aircraft.92 
5. Civil aircraft are bounded by relevant international agreements.93 
Consequently, the current international legal regime has left several national 
security issues unresolved, including aircraft rights in the airspace above EEZs and the 
treatment of state/military aircraft. With the establishment of China’s ECS ADIZ, these 
issues have come into sharper focus as states balance their right of self-defense and the 
international principle of freedom of overflight. 
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C. KEY UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
1. Airspace above EEZs 
As coastal ADIZs typically extend far beyond 200 nautical miles, they often 
overlap EEZs and encompass much larger regions of airspace over the high seas. 
Accordingly, there have been varying interpretations of airspace sovereignty in ADIZs 
directly above EEZs. Some states interpret EEZs as natural extensions of their sovereign 
territory—and plausibly the airspace above it; these states have even passed legislation in 
an attempt to assert partial or full sovereignty over that airspace. While the number of 
these states remains relatively small (seven as of 2009), they represent the alternative 
view to the vast majority of signatories to UNCLOS.94 Along the same vein, China has 
made claims to limit military activities in the airspace directly above its EEZs. Peter 
Dutton points to China’s narrower definition of lawful use of airspace above EEZs by 
referring to the 2001 U.S. Navy EP-3 incident when China claimed the United States 
abused its freedom of overflight by specifically targeting China. The incident 
demonstrated how China viewed reconnaissance flights near its borders as a “special 
security interest.”95 A Chinese spokesman was quoted as saying 
The surveillance flight conducted by the U.S. aircraft overran the scope of 
“free over-flight” according to international law . . . [in that] any flight in 
airspace above another nation’s exclusive economic zone should respect 
the rights of the country concerned. Thus, the U.S. plane’s actions posed a 
serious threat to the national security of China.96 
That perspective, however, was not shared by other regional powers. The senior 
vice minister of Japan’s Defense Agency stated that the incident occurred in 
“international airspace” and that he could not “fathom some aspect of China’s 
assertions.”97 South Korea and Russia did not issue any public statements. 
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In contrast, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia are among the 
majority of states that view military flights over the EEZs and overlapping coastal ADIZs 
as legitimate freedom of navigation and overflight operations.98 The United States, 
despite not being a signatory to UNCLOS, imposes regulations and practices that closely 
align with UNCLOS. For example, in 1983 when he established the U.S. EEZ, President 
Ronald Reagan reaffirmed that freedom of navigation and overflight would still apply to 
all countries. 
Further evidence can be observed in recent state practices, which harkens back to 
the days of the Cold War. Russian military bombers and their escort planes have resumed 
military flights near and into the ADIZs of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
countries. In 2007, Russian Tupolev-95 “Bear” bombers, which are capable of carrying 
nuclear weapons, flew along the western edge of Norway’s coastlines, prompting the 
Nordic nation to scramble its alert fighters to intercept the bombers.99 More recently, 
against the backdrop of the Ukrainian conflict, these types of flights have become 
increasingly routine. In May 2015, TU-95s were spotted over the United Kingdom’s EEZ 
within its ADIZ, making probing flights before returning to their home station.100 While 
Russian planes have never strayed into the UK’s 12 nautical mile territorial sea, they 
have prompted numerous fighter scrambles. According to the UK’s Ministry of Defense, 
these flights represent more of a routine nuisance than a genuine threat.101 Russia also 
regularly conducts these flights close to North American airspace. In 2007, Canadian 
fighter jets intercepted Russian military planes within its Canadian Air Defense Zone 
(CADIZ) off Newfoundland. Since then, the United States frequently scrambles F-22s 
and F-15s to intercept Russian bombers off of its California and Alaska coasts.102 
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When asked to explain these flights, Russia’s statements assert the lawful nature 
of the flights, claiming that “the flights by long-range aviation were made according to 
international rules . . . over neutral waters, without violating the borders of other 
states.”103 The United States agrees with this interpretation of these military flights over 
the EEZ as evidenced by its routine military flights over the islands in the South China 
Sea and near other land masses as part of freedom of navigation and overflight 
operations. 
2. Treatment of State/Military Aircraft 
Another unresolved national security issue is the treatment of state aircraft, 
particularly military aircraft during peacetime, that do not intend to enter territorial 
airspace. According to the international legal regime described above, international 
regulations addressing state aircraft have been sparse. Consequently, depending on how 
states interpret their airspace sovereignty and the legal status of other states’ aircraft, 
procedures, as well as the consequences, can vary significantly. 
In the United States, official regulations from the FAA do not explicitly 
distinguish between state and civil aircraft, but state practice suggests there is room for 
flexibility in regulatory interpretation.104 Title 14, Part 99.11 of the Code of Federal 
Regulation (CFR) states that “No person may operate an aircraft into, within, or from a 
departure point within an ADIZ, unless the person files, activates, and closes a flight plan 
with the appropriate aeronautical facility, or is otherwise authorized by air traffic 
control.”105 This regulation makes no references to state or civil aircraft; rather it uses the 
term person. This vague language implies that U.S. regulations apply to all aircraft. Still, 
as Dutton submits, “While U.S. ADIZ regulations do not explicitly exempt state aircraft, 
their application . . . [does] not apply to foreign state aircraft not bound for U.S. territorial 
airspace.”106 A U.S. military legal scholar also supports this practice: “While the United 
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States has established an ADIZ, it does not apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft 
not intending to enter U.S. airspace.”107 Indeed, in June 2008, when Russian bombers 
resumed regular military flights in the U.S. Alaskan ADIZ without filing flight plans—
contrary to FAA regulations—the U.S. military downplayed the apparent violation 
despite launching fighters to intercept and monitor the bombers. According to General 
Victor Renuart Jr., then commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), “If it is 
a Russian aircraft on a training mission, we allow them to continue to do their job.”108 
Thus, within this context, U.S. practices appear to depart from U.S. official regulations. 
As for operations in foreign coastal states’ ADIZs, U.S. military regulations also 
follow similar guidelines. Christopher Petras cites, “DOD regulations make clear the U.S. 
position that military aircraft transiting through foreign ADIZ without intending to 
penetrate foreign sovereign airspace are not required to follow foreign ADIZ 
procedures.”109 Therefore, DOD aircraft are instructed to disregard foreign ADIZ 
procedures, unless the United States has any prior agreements.110 Michael Schmitt notes, 
“It is the policy of some States, such as the United States, to refuse to comply with ADIZ 
procedures when its State aircraft do not seek entry [into national airspace].”111 These 
statements suggest an acknowledged practice of state aircraft refusing to comply with 
foreign ADIZ requirements. 
China, in contrast to United States, holds a slightly different perspective 
concerning military flights, especially reconnaissance flights, above its coastal EEZ. 
While China accepts the distinction between civil and state aircraft, it challenges the 
limits of states’ overflight rights. During the EP-3 incident in 2001, a Chinese spokesman 
argued that the U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft overstepped its rights because it 
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actively “targeted” China.112 Reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, in general, are 
considered threats to China’s security and thus do not enjoy the same overflight rights as 
other State aircraft. That policy is further underscored in Chinese academia. A paper 
published in 2005 by China Institute for International Strategic Studies asserts 
“Freedom of overflight” . . . [does] not include the freedom to conduct 
military and reconnaissance activities in [the coastal State’s] superjacent 
airspace. Such activities encroach or infringe on the national security 
interest of the coastal State, and can be considered a use of force or a 
threat to use force against that State.113 
These varying interpretations of state aircraft and their rights highlight the 
fundamental issues with operations within unilaterally established ADIZs that inherently 
overlap into international airspace. Rather than alleviating security concerns—as was the 
original purpose of ADIZs—the lack of clarity within the current legal regime, combined 
with varying state practices, has consequently created friction that heightened the 
likelihood of conflict. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, ADIZs represent an important national security tool for coastal states to 
defend their sovereign territories. While not expressly prohibited under international law, 
ADIZs still have to adhere to international laws and principles—namely freedom of 
navigation and overflight. Rooted in the principles of the Chicago Convention and 
UNCLOS, they enable global commons and facilitate the development of clear standards 
that integrally improve safety and advance aviation progress. Still, the current legal 
regime has been lacking in specific rules and procedures, leaving key national security 
issues, such as airspace sovereignty over EEZs and the treatment of state aircraft, largely 
unresolved. Consequently, some countries have made efforts to reinterpret the scope of 
the principles of international law. The next chapter will explore how China’s declaration 
of the ECS ADIZ has contributed to confusion and stoked tensions in the region. 
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IV. THE ECS ADIZ AND REGIONAL RESPONSES 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the international legal regime has been 
largely insufficient in addressing ADIZs, leaving the establishment and implementation 
to individual states’ interpretation. When China unilaterally declared its East China Sea 
ADIZ in November 2013, several countries objected or expressed strong concerns, 
including Japan and the United States, which accused China of provocation and attempts 
to alter the status quo. Against the backdrop of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes, 
China’s declaration fueled speculation among scholars and policymakers that China uses 
the ADIZ as an offensive maneuver and may impose similar zones in the South China 
Sea. In contrast, China claimed it had the right to establish and enforce its ECS ADIZ. 
Irrespective of the motives, the broader implications cannot be overlooked—the ECS 
ADIZ aggravated existing regional tensions. Nevertheless, policy lessons can be gleaned 
from the regional responses of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, which can 
ultimately illuminate possible policy pathways available to Vietnam should China 
implements an SCS ADIZ. This chapter will explore the rationale behind China’s ECS 
ADIZ and why it has been so controversial. Furthermore, it will examine the regional 
policy responses to identify the range of policy options for Vietnam. 
A. ECS ADIZ  
On November 23, 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), 
unilaterally and without consulting with other states, declared an ADIZ over the ECS. It 
stated 
The government of the People’s Republic of China announces the 
establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. . . . 
The zone includes the airspace within the area enclosed by China’s outer 
limit of the territorial sea and the following six points: 33º11'N (North 
Latitude) and 121º47'E (East Longitude), 33º11'N and 125º00'E, 31º00'N 
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and 128º20'E, 25º38'N and 125º00'E, 24º45'N and 123º00'E, 26º44'N and 
120º58'E.114 
A closer examination of the coordinates reveals key attributes within China’s ECS 
ADIZ. First, the new ADIZ overlaps portions of Japanese and South Korean ADIZs—
both of which have been in existence since the 1950s. Second, it encompasses the 
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which Japan and Taiwan also claim. Moreover, it 
includes a large percentage of the ECS, where there is considerable aviation traffic. 
Figure 2 outlines the new ADIZ with respect to preexisting regional ADIZs. 
Figure 2.  East China Sea ADIZs 
 
Source: International Crisis Group, “Old Scores and New Grudges: Evolving Sino-
Japanese Tensions,” Asia Report 258 (July 2014): 37. 
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With the geographic border defined, the PRC moved to regulate aircraft flying in 
the new zone. The PRC’s MND issued the following procedures for all aircraft via its 
“Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the 
East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone”:  
Flight plan identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone should report [their] flight plans to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China or the Civil 
Aviation Administration of China. 
Radio identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone must maintain two-way radio communications, and 
respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries 
from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. 
Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with [a] secondary radar 
transponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire 
course. 
Logo identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of 
their registration identification in accordance with related international 
treaties.115 
In short, aircraft have to provide advance flight plans, transponder codes, logo 
identification, and maintain radio contact with Chinese authorities. Failure to abide by 
these rules would result in “defensive emergency measures” by Chinese armed forces.116 
The details of those measures remains unclear. 
B. BASIS OF CRITICISM 
In its follow-up clarification statement on the same day, China’s MND spokesman 
Yang Yujun defended the new ECS ADIZ, claiming that the ADIZ did not depart from 
international practices and that China’s new zone was aimed at guarding against potential 
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air threats.117 Indeed, regional neighbors such as Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of 
Taiwan (ROC) all have previously established ADIZs, which share similar rules.118 
Moreover, there had not been any documented protests against the establishment of 
ADIZs prior to the ECS ADIZ announcement.119 Why, then, was there such an 
international uproar over China’s ECS ADIZ? 
The first point of contention stems from the manner in which China established 
the zone. Normally, states coordinate with neighboring countries to deconflict 
overlapping aviation zones. For example, states coordinate through ICAO to assign air 
traffic control responsibilities through special FIRs.120 These are large regions of airspace 
for which coastal states have assumed air traffic control responsibility. Along the similar 
lines, the United States and Canada, through the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD), jointly administer the two countries’ ADIZs. Although admittedly 
the two allies share a common interest in securing North American airspace, it is perhaps 
unrealistic for rivals such as Japan and China to jointly administer their ADIZs. 
Nevertheless, in this particular case, the Chinese government made no such efforts to 
consult with its East Asian neighbors prior to declaring its ADIZ, an action which created 
a large overlap with preexisting Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese ADIZs. 
This overlap was a major point of contention with Japanese officials because they 
viewed the move as an attempt by China to exert territorial control over the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.121 Before the declaration, the East Asian countries’ ADIZs were 
sufficiently deconflicted with very few small overlaps.122 In contrast, the new Chinese 
ECS ADIZ produced a large overlapping area; it encompassed not only the disputed 
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Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (which Japan, China, and Taiwan also claim), but also extended 
over joint U.S. military and JASDF training and bombing ranges (see Figure 2). 
In a narrower lane, the short timing between the announcement and the 
enforcement date was frequently criticized by policymakers and operators. The 
announcement was made on the morning of the November 23, 2013, and became 
effective the same morning at 10:00 a.m.—leaving little room for states and operators to 
acquaint themselves with the new rules.123 Coupled with the threat of unspecified 
emergency defensive measures from China’s military, strategic and pragmatic concerns 
from both civilian operators and states were understandable. 
A second major criticism involves not only the rules themselves, but also how 
China might apply them. The most contentious of these rules is the insistence that all 
foreign aircraft—both civil and state—entering China’s ECS ADIZ forward a flight plan 
to China’s aviation authorities, even if they do not intend to penetrate the PRC’s 
territorial airspace.124 Theoretically, this requirement would allow Chinese authorities to 
determine the destination, route of flight, type of aircraft, and many other parameters that 
could be corroborated to determine the aircraft’s intent. This demand is at odds with 
Japanese and U.S. perspectives, which differentiate between civil and state aircraft, as 
well as between those aircraft simply transiting ADIZ airspace and those intending to fly 
into territorial airspace. According to U.S. Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law 
of Naval Operations, “The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation 
to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace 
nor does the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to 
enter U.S. airspace.”125 
Many aviation scholars have argued against this requirement to file advance flight 
plans as well. Lowell Bautista and Julio Amador contend, “The Chinese ADIZ in the East 
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China Sea imposes requirements [on] both civilian and military aircraft [while] all other 
ADIZs in the world apply only to civilian aircraft. This is clearly contrary to standard 
international practice.”126 Satoru Mori, a China foreign policy observer, was more direct, 
stating that China’s demands for all foreign aircraft flying inside its ADIZ to submit 
advance flight plans “lack[s] sufficient bases in international law.”127 The United States 
supports this position, insisting upon the right of U.S. military aircraft to operate without 
complying with coastal states’ ADIZ rules provided the aircraft do not intend to enter the 
territorial airspace of that state.128 On November 26, 2013, three days after the ECS 
ADIZ announcement, the United States defended this position by flying two USAF B-52 
bombers through the ADIZ without submitting advance flight plans or notifying Chinese 
authorities.129 China monitored the aircraft but did not take any other action. The 
message was clear: the United States would not allow China’s rules to go unchallenged. 
That aside, China’s filing requirements closely mirror other states’ published 
rules. Michael Swaine notes that the published procedures of Australia, the Philippines, 
Myanmar, and Taiwan require filing advance flight plans but have no specific references 
to aircraft destination.130 Furthermore, according to Taiwan’s CAA, Japan requires 
Taiwanese airlines to submit flight plans when traversing Japan’s ADIZ.131 In response 
to this particular criticism, China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng 
provided this defense: “There is no unified international rule as to how to ask other 
countries to report flight plans to the ADIZ demarcators. Many countries require aircraft 
flying over their air defense identification zones to report flight plans beforehand. China 
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is not special in doing so.”132 Within this context, China’s rules did not violate 
international law, and the criticism China faced had little merit. 
C. CHINA’S RATIONALE FOR THE ECS ADIZ 
Nonetheless, as international criticism of the ECS ADIZ mounted, it also drew 
speculations that China would implement a similar zone in the South China Sea. Before 
such an assumption can be corroborated, however, we should examine why China 
established its ECS ADIZ to determine the basis for which China might declare an SCS 
ADIZ. Despite being characterized as aggressive, coercive, or antagonistic, China’s ECS 
ADIZ was a deliberate policy choice. Hence, it is necessary to explain China’s rationale 
for establishing the ECS ADIZ. 
One possible explanation is that the ECS ADIZ is a natural evolution of China’s 
national security apparatus to best defend the state against what it perceives as aerial 
threats. In this explanation, the purpose is to strengthen safety and security while 
preserving stability. A chronology of events, starting with the U.S. Navy EP-3 incident in 
2001, points to a need for establishing such a zone. Beijing’s annoyance with what it 
views as U.S. harassment in the South China Sea with its intelligence-gathering flights 
and freedom of navigation and overflight operations may have been a contributing factor 
in China’s decision to establish the ECS ADIZ. Additionally, despite becoming a regional 
and global economic power, China had not established its own defensive zone. Compared 
to its regional neighbors such as Japan and South Korea, this shortfall represents a 
strategic deficiency. Early indications suggest that discussion was already underway as 
early as the 2008 Beijing Olympics to establish an ADIZ over the ECS and the Strait of 
Taiwan to deal with potential air threats.133 When China finally declared the ECS ADIZ, 
MND spokesman Geng Yansheng clarified China’s intent in the December 3, 2013 
statement: 
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[The ADIZ is a] necessary measure for China to protect its state 
sovereignty and territorial and airspace security. It is conducive to 
maintaining flying safety in international airspace, and is in line with 
international laws and conventions. . . . An ADIZ is essentially different 
from territorial airspace or no-fly zones. It is not a country’s territorial 
airspace, but an international airspace demarcated outside the territorial 
airspace for the purpose of identification and early warning; it is not a no-
fly zone, and will not affect the freedom of overflight, based on 
international laws, of other countries’ aircraft. . . . The zone does not aim 
at any specific country or target, nor does it constitute a threat to any 
country or region.134 
Another potential explanation for China’s rationale points to rising Sino-Japanese 
tensions spilling over from the Senkaku/Diaoyu island disputes. In the two years leading 
up to Japan’s nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese unilateral 
decision to expand its ADIZ over Yonaguni Island highlighted to China’s leadership the 
significance an ADIZ could play in national defense policies. When Japan “nationalized” 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2012, China was further enraged. According to 
Ren Xiao, a China scholar, 
The ADIZ is a continuation of China’s reactions to Japan’s 
“nationalization” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. . . . Infuriated by Japan’s 
actions, Beijing is determined not to let Japan have unilateral de facto 
control of the islands. China keeps sending coast guard ships to the 
adjacent waters to form a situation of joint but separate patrolling. In fact, 
China is aiming for a new status quo, in which China will reciprocate 
Japan’s actions.135` 
In a similar vein, China also felt that its restraint in the years leading up to the 
dispute was underappreciated and that Japan took advantage of the situation to 
consolidate controls of the islands.136 Additionally, as another scholar observes, Japanese 
threats to shoot down China’s drones flying over the disputed area did not go over well 
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with China’s leadership.137 A statement issued by China’s MND echoed this assessment. 
In a strongly worded response on December 3, 2013, MND spokesman noted that Japan 
had been 
frequently sending vessels and planes to disturb Chinese ships and planes 
. . . openly making provocative remarks such as shooting down Chinese 
drones . . . creating excuses for revising its current constitution and 
expanding its military, trying to deny the result of World War Two. China 
[had] to take necessary reactions.138 
In this context, the ECS ADIZ was perhaps a small but critical policy choice to 
establish greater parity with Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and an effort to 
force it to recognize an ongoing dispute—something that Japan had been reluctant to do 
in the past.139 In short, it was a power play to force Japan to the negotiating tables. 
D. TOWARD A SOUTH CHINA SEA ADIZ 
China has the option to declare an SCS ADIZ when it feels its objectives can be 
achieved with an ADIZ. As evidenced in its rationale for the ECS ADIZ, an SCS ADIZ 
may be a natural progression of extending China’s early warning network. With the 
United States continuing to intensify its freedom of navigation and overflight operations 
in and around the Spratly Islands, this action will inevitably annoy—if not anger—
Beijing. An SCS ADIZ, in this case, may seem like a logical response to counter what 
China views as activities beyond the scope of freedom of overflight. Still, China needs 
time to prepare. Immediately following the ECS ADIZ declaration, China’s Defense 
Ministry announced that it “will establish other air defense identification zones at an 
appropriate time after completing preparations.”140 It has been over two years since 
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China declared the ECS ADIZ and evidence points to significant progress toward the 
possibility that it will establish another ADIZ. Chinese land reclamation and the 
construction of a 10,200 feet runway on Fiery Cross Reef confirms analysts’ suspicions 
that China is improving its infrastructure to better support both maritime and aerial 
enforcement operations—ahead of any officially declared ADIZ.141 The runway would 
extend aircraft combat range and reduce the need for aerial refueling. More recently, 
China has deployed surface to air missiles to Woody Island in the Paracels.142 
Should China’s motivation be to achieve parity—as highlighted by the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute with Japan—with regional claimants, the absence of an SCS 
ADIZ suggests that it currently does not feel that the threat in the South China Sea is 
sufficient to establish an ADIZ. Admiral Sun Jianguo, the PLA’s deputy chief of staff, 
communicated this sentiment at the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 31, 2015, commenting 
that China could set up another ADIZ, “if it feels that it’s facing a large enough threat in 
the South China Sea.”143 Nevertheless, observers point to China’s push to exert civilian 
airspace authority over the disputed islands as a precursor to military enforcement. China 
has opened up the land on the reclaimed island to private investments and plans to start 
regular flights to it later in 2016.144 Still, the broader implication is that the push for 
control will anger claimants. The pattern is aligning for a Chinese SCS ADIZ in the near, 
if not immediate, future. As one analyst asserts: 
A Chinese ADIZ over the South China Sea appears to be a looming 
possibility. . . . China might start with an ADIZ over the Paracels, where 
Vietnam has been steadfastly disputing the Chinese control. Later on, 
when its air force has the necessary long-range patrol capability, or when 
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its aircraft carrier force is ready, China may even extend its ADIZ further 
southward to include the Spratlys.145 
Consequently, if China declares its SCS ADIZ, it is likely to impose similar—if 
not exactly—the same ECS ADIZ rules and regulations. While the boundaries of such a 
zone are pure speculation, it is not unreasonable to expect an overlap of the Vietnamese 
ADIZ given the countries’ close proximity to each other. Vietnam would be forced to 
respond to this development. 
E. REGIONAL RESPONSE TO CHINA’S ECS ADIZ 
1. Japan 
When China declared its ECS ADIZ, Japan’s leaders were understandably highly 
critical and confrontational. First, the new ADIZ overlapped with existing zones that 
Japan and the ROK had established decades earlier.146 Second, part of the new ADIZ 
covers the airspace over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which Japan currently occupies and 
administers. Japan’s officials saw the move as an attempt to “pressure Japan to concede 
on the islands.”147 As foreign policy observers argued at the time, these views were part 
of the larger strain in bilateral relations between Japan and China that was newly 
exacerbated in 2012 when Japan cabinet ministers visited the Yasakuni Shrine as Chinese 
protesters demonstrated on the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.148 Tensions in the 
region were rapidly rising. Indeed, as Mark Valencia asserted at the time, “Raw 
nationalism has reared its ugly head in both countries and is influencing leadership 
decisions on international and domestic issues.”149 Thus, nationalism conceivably 
influenced why Japan’s leadership took an unusually hard line when responding to the 
Chinese ECS ADIZ declaration. 
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As tensions escalated, Japan chose to respond sharply to the new zone. The 
government, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), issued a statement 
expressing a “deep concern about China’s establishment of such zone . . . [which] may 
cause unintended consequence in the East China Sea.”150 The MOFA also declared that 
the measures “have no validity whatsoever on Japan” and demanded that China rescind 
the zone.151 On November 24, 2013, MOFA issued another statement by Minister Fumio 
Kishida saying that Japan “will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner against 
China’s attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo by coercive measures with 
determination to defend resolutely its territorial land, sea and airspace.”152 When China 
sent an air patrol to back up its new ECS ADIZ on November 23, 2013, Japan scrambled 
its alert fighters to intercept the patrol and escorted it out of the Japanese ADIZ.153 
On the commercial aviation side, reports immediately surfaced that Japanese 
airliners were initially obeying the China’s identification procedures.154 Hearing of these 
reports, the government attempted to rein in its domestic carriers and ordered them to 
ignore the new Chinese rules for flights that did not enter China’s territorial airspace. A 
few days later, according to BBC news, Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airlines—both 
Japanese national carriers—announced that they would stop filing advance flight plans 
with China for flights through the ADIZ.155 Since then, Japan, along with the United 
States, has sought legal actions against China through ICAO. It has brought forward a 
proposal to determine whether China’s ECS ADIZ threatens the “order and safety of 
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international aviation.”156 The effort sought support from ICAO council members, 
namely the UK, Australia, and members of ASEAN, in the hopes of pressuring China to 
rescind the zone. 
Diplomatically, Japan has relied on its long-time ally, the United States, to also 
bolster its hard-line stands. Immediately after the ECS ADIZ announcement, the United 
States condemned China’s ECS ADIZ. U.S. secretary of state John Kerry commented, 
“The United States does not recognize that zone and does not accept it. The zone should 
not be implemented, and China should refrain from taking similar unilateral actions 
elsewhere in the region, and particularly over the South China Sea.”157 During his 
December 2013 Asia trip, Vice President Joe Biden also accused China of unilaterally 
upsetting the status quo—echoing Prime Minister Abe’s concerns. 
Despite the blunt rhetoric from the United States, the message was mixed. The 
U.S. FAA issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) and instructed U.S. carriers to submit the 
required flight plans to the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), regardless of 
whether their aircraft intended to enter Chinese sovereign airspace.158 As scholars have 
noted, this action severely undercut Japan’s efforts to delegitimize the rules imposed by 
the China’s new ECS ADIZs and ultimately emboldened Beijing’s efforts to change the 
status quo.159 Washington tried to explain this inconsistency by portraying the FAA’s 
guidance as a safety precaution amid the ambiguity and tensions in the region. Still, the 
FAA’s guidance to its commercial carriers had a broader impact: other nations, including 
Singapore, Australia, and Thailand, eventually followed the lead of the United States. 
As a long-term solution, Japan has sought to bolster its military capabilities to 
counter the Chinese threat. Defense spending has grown steadily over the last few years; 
the JSDF defense budget grew 2.8 percent to 4.98 trillion yen ($42 billion) in 2015.160 Its 
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latest fiscal 2016/2017 budget increased to 5.05 trillion yen ($41.4 billion).161 
Additionally, Japan is deploying E-2 reconnaissance planes to track airborne aircraft and 
building up new radar stations on Yonaguni Island, its newest outpost, located 150 
kilometers south of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.162 Coupled with the successful 
reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which enables the military to 
perform a wider array of missions, these actions to normalize Japan’s military have 
underscored Japan’s efforts to strengthen its regional claims and counter perceived 
Chinese assertiveness. 
2. South Korea 
The ROK, like Japan, did not react positively to China’s ECS ADIZ. The new 
ADIZ overlapped over the disputed Socotra Rock, which the ROK and China claimed.163 
The island, also known as Ieodo by South Korea and Suyan Rock by China, is within 
both countries’ EEZs and is also home to a small South Korean ocean research 
platform.164 Before November 23, 2013, the feature fell within the Japanese ADIZ (the 
South Korean ADIZ did not encompass the rock). Echoing Japan, the South Korean 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport initially asserted that civil aircraft 
transiting China’s ECS ADIZ should not submit flight plans to China. In early December 
2013, the ROK conducted military exercises near Ieodo within the newly established 
zone.165 
That aside, the ROK’s reaction was much more tempered than the Japanese’s 
response. In previously scheduled bilateral meetings between senior defense officials at 
the end of November 2013, South Korean officials used the opportunity to quietly ask 
China to amend its ADIZ so it would not overlap with South Korea’s. ROK vice defense 
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minister Baek Seung-joo conveyed “strong regret” that the ADIZ overlapped Ieodo Rock 
and requested that China amend its boundaries to exclude the island feature.166 
To some ROK policy observers, the proposal to amend the boundaries was seen 
as an effort to “delink” the ROK’s problems from those of Japan and the United States. 
Indeed, ROK–China bilateral relations had benefited from recent rising anti-Japan 
sentiments in China. As suggested by Victor Cha, if China had made an exception for 
South Korea, the ROK would have tacitly accepted the new zone.167 China, however, 
ultimately rejected the proposal—forcing the ROK to seek an alternative solution. On 
December 8, 2013, the ROK expanded its own ADIZ 186 nautical miles southward to 
correspond to its own air traffic control region.168 
With expansion, the ROK had made a partial response to the ECS ADIZ. 
Questions on whether civilian airlines should comply still remained unresolved. On 
December 11, 2013, after several weeks of uncertainty, South Korean transport minister 
Suh Seoung-hwan announced that South Korean commercial carriers would be given 
individual authority to abide by the Chinese ADIZ rules.169 With this discretion, he also 
stressed that the decision of individual airlines was in no way representative of Seoul’s 
official position against the zone. The following day, Asiana Airlines and Korean Air 
joined the long list of carriers instructing its operators to submit advance flight plans to 
Chinese authorities. 
3. Taiwan 
Taiwan’s official reaction to the ECS ADIZ was much more muted than those of 
Japan and even South Korea.170 The Executive Yuan, the highest administrative organ, 
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took almost a week to develop and release an official statement outlining Taiwan’s 
position. During that time, Taiwan’s civilian airlines were already submitting flight plans 
to China’s aviation authorities. When the statement was published on November 29, 
2013, it was a subdued reaction. The statement read: 
The Republic of China will staunchly defend its sovereignty over the 
Diaoyutai Islands. . . . [It also] express[ed] serious concerns regarding this 
matter to mainland China through appropriate channels. . . . Standard 
military practices will not be changed due to the establishment China’s 
East China Sea ADIZ. . . . The Civil Aeronautics Administration of the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications will relay the filing of 
flight plans for civil aircraft in accordance with relevant regulations and 
practices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
regarding FIR  notification, based on requests from airline companies in 
Taiwan and abroad, to ensure the safety of passengers.171 
Undoubtedly, the relatively neutral tone of the statement reflected President Ma 
Ying-jeou’s desires to improve the cross-Strait relationship with China, in stark contrast 
to Japanese statements. Foreign policy observers have commented that Taiwan was in a 
no-win scenario, forced to walk a tightrope with Beijing while appearing to accommodate 
its backers—mainly the United States and Japan.172 On the one hand, Ma’s efforts to 
improve relations with Beijing through the East Asian Peace Initiative could have been 
jeopardized if he came off too harshly. On the other hand, completely acquiescing to the 
PRC would have undermined support from the United States and Japan. 
Nonetheless, Ma’s approach and the low-key response from the government had 
direct, negative domestic political consequences. After protests from the opposition party, 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the legislature issued a joint statement stating 
that “a rigorous protest should be submitted to China and efforts made to fall in step with 
allies in the region. Flight plans should not have to be submitted.”173 Ma attempted to 
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quell criticism of his decisions in an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun of Japan. He 
emphasized aviation safety and offered the CAA’s assistance in forwarding other 
airlines’ flight plans to Chinese authorities.174 Additionally, he drew on parallels with a 
similar overlap of Taiwan’s FIR and the Japanese ADIZ, whereby Taiwan complied with 
Japan’s instructions to submit flight plans.175 Furthermore, he added that Taiwan’s 
military patrols in the Taiwan Strait would not be affected. 
His explanation, however, was insufficient for the political opposition. The DPP 
conducted an opinion poll that highlighted the public’s displeasure with the 
administration’s response. An overwhelming 75.2 percent (out of the 1,338 valid 
responses) said that Taiwan’s CAA should not have complied with China’s request for 
flight plans, while only 15.4 percent agreed with the move.176 Two harsh prominent 
critics also emerged to challenge Ma on his ADIZ policies. Former Taiwanese president 
Lee Teng-hui criticized Ma for his “one-China mindset,” suggesting that it jeopardized 
portraying Taiwan to the international community as belonging to China. He added, “If 
the U.S. and Japan can [refuse to comply with China’s requirements], why can’t 
Taiwan?”177 Former representative to Japan, Koh Se-kai also joined the fray, accusing 
Ma of abandoning Taiwan’s strategy of building up the nation’s military capacity and 
“willingly turning himself into the leader of a ‘client state.’”178 
In sum, despite strong political backlash and the perceived muted response, the 
practical implications of Taiwan’s response did not greatly diverge from those of South 
Korean and Japan. While military aircraft were prohibited from following the new rules, 
civilian airlines—through the ROC CAA—were instructed to file the requested flight 
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information in the interest of aviation safety.179 The risk of ambiguous “defensive 
emergency measures” was simply too great for individual commercial carriers to directly 
challenge China’s ADIZ rules. Consequently, Taiwan partially acquiesced, at least from 
the commercial aviation perspective. 
4. Vietnam 
Despite the large distance between the ECS and Vietnam, the ECS ADIZ affected 
Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. After initially stating that it was “deeply 
concerned,” the Vietnam’s foreign ministry later tried to downplay the issue.180 It urged 
that “all involved parties act with restraint and solve their differences through dialogues 
and peaceful measures, in compliance with international law.”181 This type of diplomatic 
rhetoric is common when the country encounters anything contentious. Yet beneath the 
diplomatic veil, the VCP was scrambling for a cohesive response. It saw a strong reaction 
from Japan, a tempered approach from South Korea, and a muted response from Taiwan. 
The ECS ADIZ did not directly affect Vietnam’s military aircraft since they have neither 
the capability—nor the need—to project force into the ECS. Moreover, Vietnam does not 
have any sovereignty claims in the ECS. Nevertheless, Vietnam had an interest in 
responding to the new zone; Vietnam Airlines, the national carrier, has routine flights that 
transit through the zone. In the end, Vietnamese commercial carriers were instructed to 
submit flight plans to Chinese authorities when transiting through the ECS ADIZ.182 It is 
not clear whether Vietnam’s military aircraft complied with the new requirements. 
F. SUMMARY OF POLICY OPTIONS 
The reactions from the regional countries illustrate four possible policy responses. 
As identified by Alex Calvo, these options include “diplomatic initiative, 
[multilateralism/]arbitration, a combination of civilian appeasement with military 
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nonrecognition, and defiance.”183 South Korea pursued a diplomatic initiative it hoped 
would disentangle it from the controversy. The government used regularly scheduled 
bilateral talks to quietly try to persuade the PRC officials to redraw the zone and make 
exemptions for South Korean aircraft. When this effort ultimately failed, the ROK was 
forced to make its position clearer. The expansion of ROK’s own ADIZ provided a 
convenient response option that appropriately messaged to China that, while not 
completely alienating its bilateral relationship with China, the ROK was not going to 
simply concede. Moreover, the manner in which it coordinated the expansion did not 
trigger protests from stakeholder countries. 
Multilateralism/arbitration can also be advantageous in that it can stabilize the 
dispute and prevent further escalation. That outcome, however, would largely depend on 
the willingness of states to agree to the arbitration process. The Chicago Convention 
outlines a process for dispute resolution under articles 84–86, allowing states to bring 
forth issues to the ICAO council.184 Japan, as well as other countries, tried to pursue the 
ICAO arbitration process when asked the organization to rule against the new ECS 
ADIZ. This is a long and arduous process, fraught with risks, and is unlikely to produce 
substantial positive outcome, especially when any ruling lacks sufficient enforcement 
mechanisms. Still, the process can act to clarify a state’s positions, and in turn, contribute 
to increased transparency. 
Perhaps the most salient and logical policy solution is partial civilian appeasement 
with nonmilitary compliance. In this scenario, civilian aircraft are instructed to comply in 
the interest of aviation safety while military/state aircraft are ordered to reject the ADIZ 
rules outright. This policy, on the surface, aligns with the perspective that State aircraft 
are immune from coastal States’ regulation when operating in extraterritorial airspace. 
South Korea and Taiwan are among the countries that favored this approach. The United 
States, conceivably reluctantly, also followed this approach despite its strong diplomatic 
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rhetoric. This pathway allows States a way to explain deference while still upholding 
their sovereignty claims. 
Finally, a strategy of defiance is also feasible. It is the strongest of all the options 
and can serve to discourage China from other seemingly assertive actions. Defiance can 
also work to temper rising anti-Chinese sentiments within the domestic sphere as a show 
of solidarity with the populace. This policy, however, is not without its associated risks. 
For example, civilian and military aircraft could encounter additional radar queries or 
intercepts if they do not submit advance flight plans or identify themselves. This will 
unquestionably jeopardize the lives of those onboard, as it is extremely difficult to detain 
an aircraft in flight. Consequently, this strategy gives practical operators, whose primary 
concern is the safety of their passengers and aircraft, very little maneuvering space. Japan 
pursued a policy to sharply criticize and completely defy the rules; its domestic carriers 
and military were ordered to not submit flight plans to Chinese authorities. These actions 
underscore the mutual suspicion and military competition in the region. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The ECS ADIZ definitely surprised the international community. While there has 
been no singular event that hearkens to the U.S. Navy’s EP-3 incident in 2001, increasing 
intercepts between Japanese and Chinese aircraft could ignite tensions in the region. As 
China steps up its construction work on the reclaimed islands, thereby enabling civil and 
military aircraft to operate, it will soon have the capability to enforce a similar zone in the 
South China Sea, with its own rules and regulations. These aspects will undoubtedly alter 
the dynamics of the South China Sea as sovereignty disputes among more countries come 
into play. Vietnam will be forced to choose a policy response similar to, or in 
combination with, those observed during and after the November 23, 2013, 
announcement. Whatever pathway it chooses will largely depend on Vietnam’s 
leadership and the way it interprets China’s actions in the larger context of sovereignty 
claims in the South China Sea. The next chapter explores Vietnam’s foreign policy and 
how the country resolves border and maritime disputes. 
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V. VIETNAM’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND RESOLUTIONS 
In the four decades since reunification, Vietnam has had to face numerous 
territorial challenges from China, not so dissimilar from a hypothetical SCS ADIZ. 
Starting with the countries’ brief border war in February 1979, these territorial disputes—
often resulting in brief skirmishes—continued throughout the 1980s and well into the 
present day. The legacies of these conflicts, along with a long problematic history, have 
fueled tensions and mistrust between China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, since 
normalization of relations between the two neighbors in 1991, much progress has been 
made to peacefully resolve land and maritime disputes; this progress will be discussed as 
a model for successful conflict resolution. Still, issues between China and Vietnam 
involving the South China Sea remain much more complex and contentious. 
The responses from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan during the ECS ADIZ crisis 
highlight challenges Vietnam is likely to face when confronting China over the South 
China Sea. For example, in the case of Japan, nationalist elements within Japan used 
overlapping ADIZ zones over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as evidence of China’s 
territorial assertions. These nationalist elements, in pressuring the government to strongly 
respond, have complicated the disputes and made it harder for Japan’s leadership to 
accept the China’s new ADIZ. Similarly, Vietnam’s SCS disputes over the Paracel and 
the Spratly Islands contain analogous elements of nationalism; anti-Chinese sentiments, 
which have been steadily building over the last decade, have frequently strained bilateral 
relationships and aggravated tensions. In the case of South Korea, the country quietly 
requested China redraw the ECS ADIZ, but China did not comply—underscoring the 
complexity of bilateral negotiations, which do not always achieve the desired outcome. 
Vietnam has had to factor diplomatic failure into its policy calculus when party-to-party 
talks fail. As for Taiwan’s muted response, it parallels Vietnam’s political tightrope walk 
with China. On the one hand, Vietnam’s continued economic progress is integrally linked 
to China’s and depends on China’s goodwill. On the other hand, there are real negative 
political consequences for Vietnamese leadership if the VCP appears to acquiesce to 
China in respect to issues involving the South China Sea. In light of these numerous 
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challenges, Vietnam has had to employ a multilayered strategy to address Chinese 
territorial assertions. This chapter reviews Vietnam’s key foreign policy actors, 
institutions, and interests. It then traces recent Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes and 
identifies common challenges Vietnam is likely to face from a South China Sea dispute. 
It then maps the three key strategies Vietnam has employed in managing the South China 
Sea dispute with China. 
A. KEY ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS 
1. Vietnamese Communist Party 
Since independence and reunification in 1975, the VCP has been the single most 
dominant actor driving Vietnam’s foreign policy. In that regard, the VCP’s centralized 
control of political, economic, and social institutions reaches deep into Vietnamese 
society. At the very top of the political structure is the party leader—the general 
secretary—who is elected by the 16-member Politburo, a subunit of the Central 
Committee. The Politburo also nominates party leaders to the posts of president and 
prime minister. While the president’s position is largely ceremonial, the prime minister 
runs the country’s daily operations. The National Assembly, or legislative body, is seen 
as a rubber-stamping institution that passes the party’s policies without much 
disagreement. In the last decade, however, the National Assembly has had some success 
in asserting more political influence. Consequently, the chairman of the National 
Assembly holds considerable power. Together, the general secretary, the prime minister, 
the president, and the chairman of the National Assembly form the core of the 
policymaking body. 
While the single-party system reduces the potential for policy discord, internal 
disagreements as to the direction of Vietnam’s policy toward China have often surfaced. 
Competition between three primary blocs of power within the VCP reveals Vietnam’s 
multiple foreign policy pathways toward China. These blocs include conservatives, 
modernizers, and opportunists in the political middle.185 In general, conservatives favor 
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closer ties with China, while modernizers prefer economic development and 
diversification away from China.186 The opportunists do not have strong policy 
preferences but will side with either conservatives or modernizers when their domestic 
interests align. These blocs directly impact Vietnam’s foreign policy toward China. 
According to Alexander Vuving, in line with conservatives’ views, Vietnam continues to 
maintain a close relationship with China through a series of exchanges based on shared 
communist ideology.187 On the other hand, modernizers have pushed for a strategy of 
self-help and balancing against China.188 
2. Vietnam’s Leadership 
Vietnam’s political leadership is a critical component of its foreign policy vis-à-
vis China. That leadership has largely been a mixture of regime conservatives, 
modernizers, and those in the political middle.189 Before the January 2016 National 
Congress, the country’s top three positions were held by General Secretary Nguyen Phu 
Trong, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, and President Truong Tan Sang. Often viewed 
as an ideological conservative and part of the old guard from northern Vietnam, Trong 
has been identified as being pro-China.190 Conversely, the younger southerner Dung is 
regarded as a modernizer and reformist, favoring a stronger anti-China position.191 As for 
Sang, it is unclear which policy direction he supports. 
In January 2016, the Twelfth National Congress met to elect the VCP leadership 
and adopt key policy documents for the next five years. Also at stake was the top post of 
general secretary. The two leading candidates were the current prime minster, Dung, and 
the incumbent, Trong. Speculations that the more charismatic, Western-educated Dung 
would secure the leadership mantle from Trong, however, were short-lived; on January 
27, the National Congress reelected the 71-year-old Trong to a second term, cementing 
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his hold on power. The current deputy prime minister, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, is expected to 
replace Dung as prime minister. 
While the full implications of the election have not been completely realized, the 
reelection of Trong to the VCP’s top leadership position may signal a regression from 
earlier reforms and possibly drive Vietnam closer to China.192 Indeed, some observers 
fear that amid stagnant economic growth in recent years, a conservative trend would 
threaten the economic reforms spearheaded by Dung. Others, like Le Hong Hiep, a fellow 
at the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, have argued, “Many people were afraid that a 
conservative trend would prevail if Mr. Trong is re-elected. But . . . whoever they may 
be, and however conservative they may be, when they are at the helm they are under 
pressure to carry out reforms.”193 Certainly, rising anti-China sentiments in Vietnam 
fueled by incidents such as the HD-981 oil rig incident in 2014—which triggered massive 
protests throughout the country—will pressure the government to respond strongly to 
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Therefore, despite his reputation as being 
pro-China, Trong is likely to continue advancing Dung’s economic reforms and to push 
back against China.194 Furthermore, many Vietnam observers believe Trong will 
relinquish power before the end of his full term to another less conservative leader as a 
concession to the modernizer bloc.195 
3. Vietnam People’s Army 
As a special arm of the VCP, the Vietnam People’s Army is a powerful 
instrument of Vietnam’s foreign policy. Not only has it been tasked with defending the 
country against external threats, but it has also assumed major roles in domestic security, 
economic development, and politics.196 As such, its senior leadership is often dual-hatted, 
serving as both Politburo members and senior military officers. For example, the highest-
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ranking VPA officer serves as both defense minister and a cabinet member.197 
Furthermore, military officers also occupy seats in the National Assembly in addition to 
their military duties. On the national security front, the VPA has been engaged in 
modernization efforts to professionalize its forces and acquire updated military hardware 
to counter the maritime threats in the South China Sea.198 More narrowly, the VPA was 
one of the actors pushing for the 2010 decision to open Cam Ranh Port to noncombat 
vessels from foreign navies.199 
The VPA also acts as a domestic security force and operates its own commercial 
enterprises. For example, throughout the early 2000s, it has engaged in limited 
deployments to the Central Highlands to suppress ethnic unrest in the region.200 On the 
commercial side, the VPA owns and operates several highly profitable state-owned 
enterprises that generate a large portion of its income (e.g.,Viettel).201 In short, while the 
VPA is still subservient to the politics of the VCP, its position within the VCP’s 
policymaking body affords it an influential role in advancing self-help and balancing 
strategies. 
To summarize, the VCP’s primary interest is regime security. From its 
perspective, regime security equates to state security. Ever since the economic disaster of 
collectivization in the late 1970s and the following decade-long occupation of Cambodia 
that threatened the party’s legitimacy, the VCP’s primary foreign policy interest has been 
the pursuit of Doi Moi “Renovations” policies aimed at economic reforms and openness. 
Toward that end, the VCP has sought to “peacefully coexist with China, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, and the United States and to help turn Southeast Asia into a 
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region of peace, stability, and cooperation.”202 With economic reforms and normalization 
of relations with the international community, the policy has spurred unprecedented 
economic growth over the last few decades. Much of that growth has been a product of 
relative stability in the country and the region. Border disputes with China—if left 
unresolved—have the potential to evolve into a greater security threat, which can 
negatively impact Vietnam’s sovereignty and stability.203 Hence, there has been a 
concerted effort from the VCP to address those concerns. 
B. PAST TERRITORIAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
While fear continues that China will soon declare an ADIZ over the South China 
Sea, by tracing how Vietnam has responded to similar past territorial challenges from 
China, we can identify key challenges and, just as important, the strategies Vietnam is 
likely to employ. Overall, Sino-Vietnamese relations have been plagued by historical 
legacies that make it highly vulnerable to tensions primarily driven by border disputes.204 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to completely trace this legacy, it is necessary 
to highlight Vietnam’s recent territorial challenges—namely the land border, Gulf of 
Tonkin, and South China Sea disputes. These disputes highlight that peaceful resolutions 
are possible if contentious issues can be delinked from more complex ones and in the 
process establish a dense network that can help alleviate tensions between the two 
countries. 
1. Land Border Disputes 
Following the end of the Vietnam War, Vietnam’s border dispute with China 
resulted in an all-out war. China invaded Vietnam in February 1979 but withdrew its 
forces twenty-nine days later in March 1979. Although the two sides attempted 
negotiations several times between April 1979 and March 1980, no agreement emerged. 
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This uneasy peace produced frequent accusations of military incursions from both sides. 
According to Ramses Amer, “Bilateral relations remained tense during these talks and for 
most of the 1980s. Friction [was] most visible among the border.”205 Consequently, the 
dispute endured throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s. 
Progress on a resolution could not be made until Vietnam normalized relations 
with China in 1991. Before that could happen, however, the groundwork for 
normalization had to be established. Beginning in the mid-1980s, low-level contacts 
began to lead to high-level meetings in early 1989, which, in turn, resulted in diplomatic 
detente by mid-1991. In November 1991, bilateral relations were fully normalized. Still, 
the border disputes remained unresolved because negotiators and leadership set them 
aside because they were too contentious. As Amer cites, “If a resolution of the border 
disputes had been a precondition for full normalization of bilateral relations, the later 
would not have been possible in 1991.”206 By delinking the more contentious issues, 
negotiators were able to find common grounds to normalize relations. 
Once full normalization occurred, resolution of the border dispute began to take 
shape through a system of highly structured talks and discussions. These talks can be 
characterized as expert level; government level; Foreign Ministry level; and high level.207 
Expert-level talks began shortly after normalization in October 1992; the following year, 
both countries inked a preliminary agreement on the principles for handling the land 
border and Gulf of Tonkin disputes. During that process, the two countries agreed to 
establish expert-level working groups to address the broad array of issues related to the 
disputes. Subsequently, 16 rounds of talks were held between February 1994 and 
December 1999.208 The frequency and duration of these working group meetings 
intensified as talks progressed; in the year leading up to the final agreement, the working 
group met on four occasions, with talks often lasting longer than two weeks.209 On 
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December 30, 1999, Vietnam and China signed the Land Border Treaty. Shortly 
afterwards, both countries’ legislatures ratified the treaty. 
Following ratification, the difficult task of physically demarcating the border 
became apparent. The treaty, as published by Vietnam in 2002, did not include any 
accompanying maps. Again, in 2002, China and Vietnam established a joint committee 
on the demarcation process to map out a plan to plant landmarks along the border. The 
long process was complete in 2008—marking an end to the land border dispute. 
2. Gulf of Tonkin Disputes 
The Land Border Treaty negotiation framework was also successfully employed 
to resolve the Gulf of Tonkin dispute. Bach Long Vi Island, an island that China had 
occupied before transferring control to Vietnam in 1957, had long been a major point of 
contention. At the core of the dispute were Bach Long Vi’s EEZ and continental shelf 
entitlements. Vietnam’s position was that the island’s entitlements should be fully 
included in any agreement to divide the Gulf of Tonkin. Conversely, China’s interest was 
to minimize the impact of the island to limit Vietnam’s claims. After an initial agreement 
in October 1993 to outline the steps for handling the Gulf of Tonkin dispute, Vietnam and 
China established joint working groups at the expert-level to begin working the 
negotiations. Similar to the land border negotiations, a series of over 18 working group 
meetings between March 1994 and December 2000 finally produced an agreement to 
share the Gulf of Tonkin.210  
Running parallel to these expert-level meetings were high-level meetings between 
the two countries’ general secretaries. In July 1997, during an official visit by VCP 
general secretary Do Muoi to China, he promised “to try to conclude the treaty . . . on 
maritime delineation in the Tonkin Gulf before the end of 2000.”211 Again, in 1999, both 
countries’ general secretaries, Le Kha Phieu and Jiang Zemin, issued a joint statement: 
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The two sides agree to place the primary issues foremost, show sympathy 
and compromise with each other, conduct fair, rational and friendly 
consultations, and taking into account international law and reality, try to 
satisfactorily settle the outstanding territorial and border issues between 
the two countries through peaceful negotiations. The two sides express 
their determination to accelerate the process of negotiations and raise their 
working efficiency for the concluding the treaty on land border in 1999; to 
complete settlement of the maritime delineation of the Tonkin Gulf in 
2000; and to join efforts in making their common borderline one of peace, 
friendship and stability.212 
Before an agreement could be reached, however, the issue of fishing rights also 
had to be addressed. Separate but parallel working groups held six rounds of discussions 
between April and December 2000 to discuss how to designate joint fishing areas.213 
Overall, according to a Vietnam scholar, between 1993 and 2000: 
The two sides held seven rounds of negotiation at the governmental level, 
three nonofficial meetings of the two heads of the governmental 
delegations on the territorial and boundary issues, eighteen rounds of 
negotiations of the mixed working groups, nine nonofficial meetings of 
Groups of Legal and Technical Experts, and ten rounds of Groups of 
Experts making the General Nautical Chart of the Gulf.214 
On December 25, 2000, Vietnam and China signed the Agreement on the 
Delimitation of Waters, EEZ and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin (Delimitation 
Agreement) and the Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin (Fishing 
Agreement). Figure 3 summarizes the boundaries of the agreement. 
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Figure 3.  Gulf of Tonkin Boundary Agreement 
 
Source: “The Evolution of Asia’s Contested Waters,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, accessed 
February 28, 2016, http://amti.csis.org/maritime-disputes/. 
The terms of the agreement outlined a series of coordinates that ultimately limited 
EEZs rights by drawing a line of equidistance. Vietnam obtained 53.23 percent while 
China received 46.77 percent; additionally, Bach Long Vi was only given a 15 nautical 
mile limit instead of the standard 200 nautical mile EEZ entitlement.215 
Overall, the Land Border Treaty and Gulf of Tonkin negotiations underscore a 
common challenge for Vietnam—the task of delinking the current dispute from more 
complex disputes. During the course of the land border negotiations, the land border 
disputes were initially separated from the normalization discussions. Once normalization 
was accomplished, further progress could then be made on the land border negotiations. 
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During the Gulf of Tonkin discussions, both China and Vietnam had to agree to the exact 
location of the “mouth” of the Gulf of Tonkin. This effort, as well as setting aside 
contentious issues such as oil and natural gas rights, made it possible to separate the Gulf 
of Tonkin from the larger SCS debate. Thao Hong Nguyen observes that the delimitation 
of the Gulf of Tonkin did not “affect or prejudice the position of either state regarding 
other ocean matters.”216 As demonstrated, resolution may be possible if both parties can 
agree to set aside contentious issues and focus on their mutual interests. 
Still, what happens when delinking is not possible? When South Korea attempted 
to delink China’s ECS ADIZ from the Ieodo/Suyan Rock dispute, it was unable to do so. 
Vietnam also recognizes delinking is not always feasible and negotiations may have to 
take a different path. Its strategies toward China, as we will discuss later, reflect this 
reality. 
3. South China Sea Disputes 
While the land border and Gulf of Tonkin disputes with China have been largely 
resolved, the South China Sea dispute is more complex and remains the principal strain 
on bilateral relations with China. With China’s mounting economic and military strength 
in the region, China has been very assertive over its claims of the Paracel and Spratly 
island chains in the South China Sea. The core of the dispute centers on overlapping 
territorial claims between China and other claimants in the region (Brunei, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Taiwan), and disputes have spilled over onto issues such as fishing rights 
and oil exploration. Vietnam claims that the islands are within its UNCLOS EEZ and that 
it is entitled to varying rights. China, however, claims that the islands—based on 
historical maps—are within its nine-dash line and are subsequently within its sovereign 
territory and jurisdiction. Furthermore, Chinese land reclamation projects on the reefs of 
the Paracel and Spratly Islands have exacerbated tensions between multiple claimants. 
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C. KEY CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES 
Domestic and international pressures have further complicated the South China 
Sea disputes. In Vietnam, as in Japan, a broad and very vocal anti-Chinese citizenry have 
emerged and started to exert pressure on leadership, making resolving disputes more 
difficult. Additionally, geopolitical pressures from the United States have created unique 
challenges for Vietnam, forcing the VCP to carefully calibrate its growing relationship. 
Consequently, if China imposes an SCS ADIZ, Vietnam is likely to face similar domestic 
and geopolitical challenges. 
1. Anti-Chinese Sentiments 
Similar to Japan with its growing nationalist sentiment, Vietnam has had to 
carefully manage rising anti-Chinese sentiment within the country. Since 2005, this 
sentiment has been building and continues to regularly interrupt bilateral relations with 
China. For example, in January 2005, Chinese maritime patrols killed nine fishermen and 
arrested several others in the Gulf of Tonkin for violating China’s annual unilateral-
imposed fishing ban (May 16–August 1).217 This event went unreported for six days and 
did not elicit a government response until a local newspaper published the news.218 After 
the news broke, the Vietnamese government lodged a diplomatic protest against China. 
The incident also sparked anti-China protests from overseas Vietnamese graduate 
students who mobilized to demonstrate against China’s “brutalities” and to express 
solidarity with fellow Vietnamese.219 
Vietnam’s mainstream elites have also exerted similar pressures on the VCP. 
These elites include prominent high-ranking retired military officers, academics, lawyers, 
and other professionals.220 General Vo Nguyen Giap—the nationally revered hero of 
Vietnamese independence—was one of the notable voices who led a public movement in 
January 2009 against a joint Sino-Vietnamese bauxite development plan that called for a 
                                                 
217 Tuong Vu, “The Party v. the People: Anti-China Nationalism in Contemporary Vietnam,” Journal 





large influx of Chinese workers into Vietnam’s Central Highlands. He accused the VCP 
leadership of failing to consider the national security implications of such a flood of 
workers.221 
Between 2007 and 2010, sporadic public protests have ensued as a result of 
China’s actions involving the South China Sea. In December 2007, a series of student-led 
street protests that organized through social media, blogs, and text messaging erupted 
when China announced plans to create an administrative region to manage the disputed 
Paracel and Spratly island chains.222 Again, between June 2009 and September 2010 
multiple protests followed when Vietnamese news reported that China was impounding 
and detaining Vietnamese fishing boats and crewmembers.223 
In May 2014, tensions reached an inflection point when China deployed a floating 
oil exploratory rig (HD-981) into Vietnam’s EEZ to drill near the disputed Paracel 
Islands. Escorted by a PLAN contingent and coast guard ships, the rig set out to drill 
from May to August 2014. Altercations between Vietnamese civilian fishing ships and 
the Chinese flotilla protecting the rig ensued and eventually resulted in the sinking of a 
Vietnamese vessel. The actions not only sparked a diplomatic protest from Vietnam but 
also incited widespread anti-China riots throughout the country. Several Chinese citizens 
were killed and numerous businesses, including Taiwanese, South Korean, and Japanese 
factories, were destroyed—forcing China to evacuate its citizens from Vietnam and 
withdraw the rig in July, one month earlier than publicly announced. 
While so far the VCP has been mostly successful at containing nationalist 
sentiments through its domestic security apparatus and the VPA, these sentiments 
continue to pose a special challenge for Vietnamese leadership. Similar to Taiwan’s 
responses during the Chinese ECS ADIZ, Vietnamese leadership has had to walk a fine 
line between supporting nationalist sentiments and provoking its larger neighbor, China. 
Consequently, Vietnam, like Taiwan, has had to carefully calibrate its response to 
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maintain its close relationship with China, while appearing to placate and support its 
domestic nationalist elements. 
2. Foreign Relations 
Japan’s response to China’s ECS ADIZ highlights another key challenge—its 
relations with the United States. While Japan relies heavily on the U.S.-Japan alliance to 
defend its territory, the relationship between Vietnam and the United States is more 
delicate. Managing this delicate relationship is one of the key challenges involving issues 
related to the South China Sea. 
As China’s near-peer rival, the United States is in the best position to help 
Vietnam balance against China. Since normalization in 1995, Vietnam-U.S. relations 
have dramatically improved as the countries’ interests have slowly converged. 
Economically, the United States has become Vietnam’s largest trading partner, with 
annual exports totaling over $24.5 billion.224 Vietnam is also poised to gain significant 
access to markets as the Trans-Pacific Partnership advances toward complete ratification. 
Along the same lines, political and military ties have also strengthened. High-level visits 
by former president Bush in 2006 and secretary of state John Kerry in 2013 have 
emphasized the United States’ desire to advance the relationship.225 More recently, when 
General Secretary Trong visited Washington in July 2015, he signed the agreement to 
upgrade the relationship from a “strategic partnership” to a higher “comprehensive 
partnership.” President Obama is set to reciprocate with a visit to Vietnam in May 2016. 
Military-military ties also have extended beyond joint POW/MIA accounting to now 
include naval port visits and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation. 
While these are modest improvements, Vietnam’s decision to open Cam Ranh Port to all 
navies is viewed as an indirect invitation for more U.S. naval presence in the region.226 
                                                 
224 “Vietnam,” Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed February 24, 2016, 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/vnm/. 
225 Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory: From Internal Development to External 
Engagement,” ASPI Strategic Insights no. 59 (2012): 7, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/strategic-
insights-59-vietnams-strategic-trajectory-from-internal-development-to-external-engagement/ 
SI59_Vietnam.pdf. 
226 Hiep, “Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory,” 11. 
 67 
Nevertheless, despite the acceleration in ties, there is a general reluctance among 
conservative Vietnamese leadership to deepen the relationship with the United States.227 
Legacies such as the Vietnam War and the VCP’s suspicion of U.S. encroachment on 
regime security remain obstacles to a closer relationship.228 Moving closer to the United 
States is also politically risky and may invite unintended consequences from China. 
Along the same lines, there is also the fear of overreliance on foreign powers. For 
example, in March 1988, when China moved to militarily take over Johnson Reef in the 
Spratlys from Vietnam, an action that resulted in seventy-four Vietnamese casualties, the 
Soviet Union—Vietnam’s principle supporter at the time—did not dispatch its warships 
from Cam Ranh Bay to assist.229 This inaction left a deep mark on Vietnamese leadership 
and may have helped shaped Vietnam’s decision to acquire its own military capabilities. 
3. Key Strategies 
To address challenges related to the South China Sea, Vietnam has turned to a 
mixture of strategies that include bilateral party-to-party talks, multilateralization, and 
self-help/balancing.230 Party-to-party relations, developed and sustained through the Land 
Border Treaty and Delimitation Agreement negotiations, remain fundamental to 
Vietnam’s overall strategy and have been historically successful in reducing tension. 
Early on, expert-level talks in 1995 began to institutionalize a conflict management 
mechanism.231 Between 1998 and 2001, both countries restrained from accusations in 
connection with incidents relating to the SCS.232 This reluctance, however, did not 
necessarily mean the two countries were unwilling to voice their displeasure. Indeed, 
Vietnam lodged a diplomatic protest in March 1999 when China declared a temporary 
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fishing ban in the SCS. Still, the period saw mutual restraint from both countries as they 
worked toward resolving the other less contentious land border and Gulf of Tonkin 
disputes. 
During the early 2000s, in the process of negotiating the Land Border Treaty and 
Delimitation Agreement, a deep network of close party-to-party relationships formed, 
enabling “regularly schedule[d] exchange[s] by state presidents, prime 
ministers/premiers, and minister level delegations.”233 Because Vietnam considers these 
exchanges as critical components of its conflict management strategy, it has created a 
Joint Steering Committee to carefully manage these relationships.234 Between 2001 and 
2008, these exchanges helped facilitate a period of relatively stable relations between the 
two countries. According to Amer, despite short periods of tension associated with 
fishing bans and resource exploration, Sino-Vietnamese relations regarding the South 
China remained stable.235 
Between 2009 and 2013, as tensions began to mount, party-to-party talks were 
critical in alleviating some of the pressures. For example, after numerous arrests of 
Vietnamese fishermen between May 2009 and August 2010, the two countries’ prime 
ministers met in Hanoi in late October 2010 and “agreed to seek satisfactory resolutions 
of existing issues relating the South China Sea.”236 As Amer observed, the arrests 
stopped after this meeting.237 After a short period of calm, tensions again flared in 2011 
when a Chinese fishing boat severed a sensitive cable from a PetroVietnam survey vessel. 
Still, high-level talks managed alleviate tensions by late June 2011.238 By October 2011, 
high-level summits between the two countries concluded in an Agreement on Basic 
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Principles, which, according to Amer, represented a “de facto bilateral code of 
conduct.”239 
Despite its extensive network of party-to-party relationships, Vietnam has also 
opted to pursue a strategy of multilateralization because of its relatively weaker position 
with respect to China. Multilateralizing also affords Vietnam the ability to reframe the 
issue and ally with other nations who share similar interests against a larger rival. 
Vietnam sees ASEAN and other regional institutions as critical to forwarding this 
strategy. For example, Vietnam, along with ASEAN, adopted the nonbinding declaration 
on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea (DoC) in 2002. In 2009, Vietnam and 
Malaysia jointly submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to 
define the limits of coastal states’ continental shelves. In 2010, Vietnam used its ASEAN 
chairmanship to put the SCS on the agenda at the annual meetings. As Thayer notes: 
Vietnam’s [strategy] is to promote multilateral efforts to enmesh China in 
a web of cooperative relations. Vietnam utilizes regional institutions such 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit. During 2010, 
Vietnam used its position as Chair of ASEAN to internationalize the South 
China Sea issue and resume sessions of the ASEAN-China Joint Working 
Group to implement the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea (DoC).240 
Yet, not all ASEAN countries share Vietnam’s strong position against China. Malaysia, 
who chaired ASEAN in 2015, tempered its official language regarding the South China 
Sea disputes, despite demands from the Philippines to take a tougher stance. That aside, 
progress has been slow in the negotiations and implementation of a South China Sea 
Code of Conduct as China has little incentive to finalize an agreement with ASEAN.241 
Consequently, while diplomacy and negotiations play out, Vietnam is also 
embarking on a series of self-help and balancing initiatives mirroring Japan’s effort to 
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normalize and expand the role of its Self-Defense Force. While its defense budget is 
nowhere near the scale of Japan’s budget, Vietnam is, nevertheless, seeking to bolster its 
military capabilities to counter the Chinese threat by modernizing and professionalizing 
its forces. According to a recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) report, Vietnam currently ranks eighth in global arms imports; in 2014, its 
military expenditures totaled approximately $4.42 billion.242 Vietnam’s purchase of 
Russian submarines is seen as a defensive strategy aimed at area denial, making it costly 
for militarily superior rivals to directly engage Vietnamese forces.243 As it takes delivery 
of its sixth and final kilo-class submarines, the VPA is also upgrading its air defense 
capabilities. The VPA ordered 12 additional SU-30 fighters from Russia in 2013, with the 
Indian Air Force providing flight training.244 More recently, the VPA has announced 
plans to purchase Israeli radar and antiaircraft missile systems to shore up its coastal 
defense.245 
D. CONCLUSION 
Land border and maritime disputes have been the primary drivers of tensions 
between Vietnam and China. Yet Vietnam successfully and peacefully resolved some of 
these disputes through a system of talks aimed at diffusing tensions and advancing 
common interests. Initiated shortly after normalizing relations with China in 1991, 
multilevel talks—ranging from expert-level to high-level talks—have helped end the land 
border and Gulf of Tonkin disagreements by delinking contentious issues. These talks 
have fascinated a dense network of close party-to-party relationships that remains critical 
to diffusing tensions elsewhere. 
Resolution of more contentious disputes in the South China Sea, however, 
continues to be much more elusive as domestic and geopolitical factors come into play. 
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Anti-Chinese sentiments have often undermined bilateral talks and escalated tensions. 
Additionally, relations with major powers, especially the United States, bear both upside 
and downside risks. In light of these challenges, Vietnam has had to complement its 
party-to-party talks by multilateralizing and growing its self-help capabilities. Should an 
SCS ADIZ become a reality, Vietnam is likely to tailor all—or parts—of these strategies 
when it confronts China. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
When China unilaterally declared its ECS ADIZ in November 2013, the event 
ignited an international debate surrounding ADIZs and prompted various responses from 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Japan, along with the United States and other nations, 
accused China of attempting to alter the status quo and escalating tensions in the region. 
China, however, defended its position by claiming it was within its rights to establish 
such a zone. While some countries complied with China’s ECS ADIZ procedures, others 
have partly or completely disregarded them. Furthermore, China’s ECS ADIZ has 
sparked fears among scholars and policymakers that a similar zone might be implemented 
over the SCS. Vietnam, as a coastal neighbor of China, would be the country most 
affected by a Chinese SCS ADIZ. How would Vietnam respond to such a declaration of 
an ADIZ in the region? 
A review of the international legal regime reveals that while international law 
does not expressly prohibit the establishment of ADIZs, it lacks specific rules and 
procedures, leaving key national security issues such as airspace sovereignty over EEZs 
and the treatment of state aircraft largely unresolved. As a result, states have unilaterally 
established their own ADIZ procedures and practices; these approaches often conflict 
with each other, leading to further friction over China’s ECS ADIZ. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the responses from Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan during the ECS ADIZ crisis has yielded several policy choices for Vietnam. 
These options include bilateral diplomacy, multilateralization/arbitration, complete 
defiance, and a mixture of civilian acquiescence with military noncompliance.246 While 
these options are not mutually exclusive, Vietnam will likely apply them in a manner 
consistent with its current multilayered strategy of party-to-party talks, 
multilateralization, and self-help initiatives. 
Consequently, Vietnam’s response to a Chinese ADIZ in the SCS will depend not 
only on the VCP’s leadership preferences, but also on Vietnam’s domestic and 
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geopolitical calculations. If VCP conservatives are dominant, as the reelection of General 
Secretary Trong during the Twelfth National Congress suggests, Vietnam will likely 
prefer an option of deference that would avoid antagonizing China but still maintain the 
close bilateral party-to-party relationship that was established during the land border 
negotiations in the 1990s. In this particular scenario, Vietnam would likely employ a 
diplomatic initiative to smooth over any potential tensions. Following this approach, 
Vietnam’s civilian and military operators would be instructed to comply with China’s 
SCS ADIZ procedures. Vietnam would continue to use its bilateral party-to-party talks, 
which have been effective at ending long-standing territorial disputes and diffusing 
tensions. 
Pure diplomacy, however, carries its own set of risks. As demonstrated during the 
2014 HD-981 oil rig crisis, Vietnam’s failure to prevent China’s deployment of the rig 
into Vietnam’s EEZ stoked domestic anti-Chinese nationalism and prompted widespread 
riots, damaging Sino-Vietnamese relations. Furthermore, compliance with Chinese ADIZ 
requirements might imply relinquishment of airspace control and by extension, its 
maritime claims in the South China Sea. The challenge for leadership, therefore, is 
delinking airspace control from maritime claims. 
Conversely, if modernizers are dominant, Vietnam would be more inclined to 
multilateralize the issue and adopt a defiant posture similar to Japan’s response during the 
2013 ECS ADIZ crisis. Theoretically, after initially condemning China’s actions, VCP 
leadership would issue orders to both its military and commercial aircraft to not comply 
with China’s procedures. Vietnam could later seek legal recourse through the ICAO 
arbitration process to determine if China’s SCS ADIZ threatens the order and safety of 
international aviation. Additionally, the Vietnamese military would likely increase 
surveillance flights in the area to undermine any new rules from China’s SCS ADIZ. This 
policy path, however, risks provoking China and further straining Sino-Vietnamese 
relations. Furthermore, from a practical perspective, defiance is also risky. For example, 
Vietnamese civilian and military aircraft flying through China’s SCS ADIZ could 
encounter additional radar queries or intercepts if they do not follow specified 
procedures, potentially endangering the lives of those onboard. Vietnam does not have 
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the power parity, either militarily or economically, that Japan or the United States can 
apply to directly challenge China. Consequently, direct defiance is perhaps a losing 
proposition and Vietnam is not likely to favor this option. 
Another policy options involves Vietnam’s expanding its own ADIZ, similar to 
South Korea’s actions regarding the ECS ADIZ, as a signal to China that Vietnam is 
unwilling to acquiesce. In this scenario, Vietnam would be required to exercise its newly 
acquired self-help capabilities, especially its aerial assets, to both undermine a Chinese 
SCS ADIZ and to enforce its own expanded zone. Vietnam would need to increase aerial 
patrols and intercept PLA aircraft that overfly this new zone. This option might be 
considered if Vietnamese leaders felt that they could not adequately resolve the dispute 
through other means and that they might lose significant domestic legitimacy. Although 
this option is viable, it is not likely, as it could be interpreted as escalatory in nature. 
Perhaps the most salient and least escalatory solution is partial civilian 
appeasement in conjunction with military noncompliance. Regardless of whether VCP 
conservatives or modernizers are dominant, Vietnamese civilian aircraft would be 
instructed to comply with Chinese ADIZ procedures in the interest of aviation safety 
while military/state aircraft would be ordered to rebuff the ADIZ rules. This policy 
conforms to the international legal regime for state aircraft, which are immune from 
coastal states’ regulations when operating in extraterritorial airspace. Additionally, this 
approach mirrors state practices of the United States, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Furthermore, it provides a way to decouple aviation safety from more contentious issues 
of sovereignty, allowing Vietnam to explain deference to its domestic audiences while 
still upholding its sovereignty claims in the SCS. This policy is the most likely to be 
embraced by Vietnam’s leadership. 
In conclusion, while a Chinese SCS ADIZ has the potential to exacerbate tensions 
between Vietnam and China, the two countries could still peacefully resolve their 
disputes and improve relations. Vietnam has a robust network of bilateral party-to-party 
relations it can rely on to preemptively offset tensions. China may negate potential 
negative criticism of territorial assertions if it is transparent in the manner it establishes a 
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SCS ADIZ by coordinating with Vietnam and other countries. All of this, however, is 
dependent on China’s strategic objectives in the SCS.  
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